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1. Introduction 
 
Dumping is a price discrimination violation that is regulated by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Though competition language is used in anti-dumping law, the 
application of anti-dumping law fails to take into account the same competition 
principles that it claims to be attempting to protect. Section VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 19941 also known as the anti-dumping 
agreement describes dumping as the act of selling goods in an export market at a lower 
price than the country of origin.2 In domestic jurisdictions, competition law exists to 
ensure that firms with market power do not abuse their positions. However when 
international firms are involved, domestic laws are limited in their ability to enforce 
these laws. This is more so where countries are party to the GATT 1947 (WTO) 
agreement where countries agreed to open their markets and to offer preferential 
treatment to member countries  as contained in section 1 of the GATT 1947 ‘general 
most favoured nation treatment’ (MFN)3. To protect national interests, WTO member 
countries (members) agreed to incorporate trade remedies into the WTO agreement, 
one of which is the anti-dumping agreement (ADA). In this paper, to differentiate 
between the WTO anti-dumping regulation and the domestic anti-dumping regulation, 
the WTO anti-dumping regulation will be termed ‘the anti-dumping agreement’ and 
the South African anti-dumping regulation will be termed ‘SA anti-dumping 
regulation’ this is to prevent confusion when discussing the  two Acts.  
                                                     
 
1
 Agreement on the implementation of article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) 
1994 (Anti-dumping) 
2 C Lumina ‘Free trade or just trade? The World Trade Organisation, human rights and development 
(Part 1)’ (2008) 12 Law democracy and development 20 p24 
3 General agreement on tariffs and trade of 1947 section 1, which states that any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity… shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for territories of all other contracting parties. 
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Anti-dumping regulation is comparable to the regulation of unilateral conduct by firms 
in competition law, specifically price discrimination conduct by dominant firms. Section 
9(d)(iv) of the South African competition law4;  section 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in Europe jurisdiction;5 and The Robinson-
Patman Act6  in United States of America (U.S.) all deal with price discrimination 
offences. This paper will focus on anti-dumping and competition law as practised in 
South Africa even though cases will be drawn from the different jurisdictions for 
illustration purposes. 
According to the WTO, dumping occurs when a product is ‘introduced into the 
commerce of another country at less than its normal value7, if the export price of the 
product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the 
ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined  for consumption in the 
exporting country.’8.  However before anti-dumping duties can be applied, ‘material 
injury’ to an industry in the importing country producing a ‘like’ product has to be 
shown. It also has to be shown that the injury to the industry is a direct result of the 
increase in the dumped imports.  
Central to the dumping investigation, is the description of ‘normal value’ which in anti-
dumping legislation does not take into account that price discrimination is a valid 
economic business strategy.  In business strategy price discrimination involves 
segmenting the target market into different submarkets. If the submarkets have 
different elasticities of demand at a given price, the business can increase profit by 
charging different prices. The anti-dumping definition of ‘normal value’ therefore acts 
                                                     
 
4 Competition Act No 89 of 1998 s9. 
5 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Sections 101 and102  
6 The Robinson-Patman Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 et seq.  
7 Highlight authors own. 
8 Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 
Subsection 2(1) 
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as a safeguard to domestic industries seeking protection as it does not make allowances 
for sound business practises. This is in direct contrast to the treatment of price 
discrimination and pricing below cost in competition law which are both treated as 
‘rule of reason’ offences making allowances for the possibility that firms are engaging in 
these actions for competitive reasons9. Pricing below cost is clearly defined in the 
competition act as a firm selling below its ‘marginal or average variable cost’10 which 
restricts the business practices that are actionable as it clearly defines the cost basis to be 
used in comparing the selling price and the cost price.  
The primary premise in price discrimination and predation investigations is that the 
firm in question is able to use its dominant position to set prices independently. As a 
result, the firm is able to restrain competition from new entrants by abusing its position 
of dominance. It is this dominance that competition law seeks to monitor and regulate 
by ensuring that firms that have monopoly position or market power11 do not abuse 
their position by attempting to ‘price out’ smaller competitors. Anti-dumping 
regulation however does not take into consideration the size of the competitor firm. The 
focus of anti-dumping investigations is on the pricing action rather than on the effect on 
competition that the pricing action will have. This is contradictory to the economic 
thought that price discrimination is based on. Economic theory states that unless a firm 
has sufficient market power, its continued pricing below cost would result in its own 
demise. However, with sufficient market power a firm is able to stifle smaller 
competitors who are unable to sustain the low prices for a prolonged period. Cognisant 
of the requirement for market power for a firm to be able to inhibit competition, 
competition law focuses on firms with market power in its attempt to regulate the 
behaviour of firms. Anti-dumping law however has no such test ensuring that firms 
                                                     
 
9 Competition Act No 89 of 1998 ss8 and 9. 
10 Competition Act No 89 of 1998 subsec 8(d)(iv). 
11 According to the OECD, a firm is considered to have market power if it has at least 40 per cent of the 
industry market share. However jurisdictions differ in their market share demarcation for dominance. 
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that are not in a position to hinder competition are still able to be held culpable of 
‘dumping’ in a foreign country. 
In keeping with competition law, the anti-dumping agreement restricts the use of anti-
dumping measures to where injury can be shown12. The anti-dumping agreement 
further defines the term ‘injury’ as ‘material injury to a domestic industry, threat of 
material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of 
such an industry’13. However, the wording related to the injury requirement in the anti-
dumping agreement is focused on the effect on price rather than the effect on the 
industry in question. Section 3 (determination of injury) of the anti-dumping agreement 
requires investigating authorities to consider ‘whether the effect of such imports is 
otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases’14. In 
essence, within anti-dumping regulation, even though the price discrimination can be 
shown to be competitive rather than ‘unfair’15, dumping duties would still apply. This is 
in contrast to competition law which not only requires that price discrimination be 
shown but that a ‘significant lessening of competition’ needs to be demonstrated before 
it becomes illegal. This competition requirement ensures that firms do not attempt to 
gain protection against aggressive competition but rather that the law protects the very 
competitive process that allows firms to thrive. 
                                                     
 
12 Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994, 
section 3 
13 Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994, 
foot note 9. 
14 Agreement on the implementation of article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade of 1994, 
subsec 3(2) 
15 Of interest the WTO does not attempt to define what would constitute as ‘unfair’ trade practices. This is 
reflected in the statement, ‘If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally 
charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? The 
WTO "Anti-dumping Agreement" does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or 
cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions.’ Available from 
https://search.wto.org/search?q=cache:0zpxrMZPYbwJ:www.wto.org/english/news_e/infocenter_e/b
rief_anti_e.doc+unfair&access=p&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=ISO-8859-
1&client=english_frontend&site=English_website&proxystylesheet=english_frontend&oe=UTF-8 
accessed on 20 September 2015 
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The concept of ‘like product’ is essential in the investigation and analysis of competition 
related inquiries. The establishment of which products are comparable to the product 
under analysis defines the scope of the investigation. Failure to narrowly define this 
range of products can result in a type I error (false positive)16, which leads to the 
possibility of restricting pro-competitive activities. The definition of ‘like product’ in the 
anti-dumping agreement can be criticised for being ambiguous and open to 
interpretation. This is in contrast to the definition of ‘like product’ in other World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) articles17 where greater clarity has been given to the description 
and test of likeness making it less open to interpretations. Competition law has also 
given weight to the notion of likeness, opting to utilise the concept of equivalence and 
‘like grade and quality’ to distinguish the substitutability of the products in question. 
This is essential as it demarcates the product scope of the investigation and 
consequently limits the potential to misuse the system by rent seekers.  
The requirements for anti-dumping investigations necessitate the coming together of 
industry participants to show that they are in agreement with the application for anti-
dumping duties on the product. The anti-dumping agreement states that before an 
investigation is initiated,  
‘the application shall be considered to have been made ‘by or on 
behalf of the domestic industry’ if it is supported by those domestic producers whose 
collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like 
                                                     
 
16 A type I error occurs when a correct null hypothesis is rejected leading to a false positive. This leads to 
the prohibition of what would have otherwise been pro-competitive.  
17 The concept of like product is central to the treatment of the ‘general most favoured-nation treatment’ 
(article 1 of GATT 1947) and ‘national treatment on internal taxation and regulation’ (article III of GATT 
1947). The test generally used for ‘likeness’ under GATT 1947 is ‘(i) the properties, nature and quality of 
the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits — more comprehensively 
termed consumers’ perceptions and behaviour — in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff 
classification of the products.’ See WTO analytical index available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_01_e.htm#article1accessed 
on 24 August 2015 
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product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for 
or opposition to the application.  However, no investigation shall be initiated when 
domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per 
cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.’18  
Though some industry participants have argued that this threshold might be too low, 
some have indicated that the investigation requirements might foster collusion of the 
domestic industry to ensure that the investigation is undertaken19. The ‘chicken wars’20 
have clearly highlighted this challenge, with the International Trade Administration 
Commission of South Africa (ITAC) imposing anti-dumping duties on chicken imports 
from Brazil and the United States of America (USA) whilst at the same time, the 
Competition Commission when requested for an opinion by the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Commission produced a report which highlighted the vertical integration which exists 
in the sector.21 
It is this possibility of collusion that has led some practitioners to argue that anti-
dumping should not exist separate to competition law but that rather, it should be 
guided by the principles of competition law to complement the investigation of the 
competition issues inherent in anti-dumping cases.  ‘Moen indicates that whereas anti-
dumping action is focused on protecting the import-competing industry, the objective 
of competition policy is to ‘safeguard competition, rather than individual 
competitors.’22 This is particularly important as the anti-dumping agreement is silent on 
the necessity to prevent the possibility of collusion even though it is in direct 
contradiction to competition principles which do not permit market collusion whether 
                                                     
 
18 Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994, 
subsection 5(4) 
19 M Zanardi  ‘Antidumping law as a collusive device’ (2004) 37 CLJ  
20 The term ‘chicken war’ has been used in the media to describe the attempt by the South African chicken 
industry to have dumping duties imposed on imports as a way of protecting the industry. 
21 S Ramburuth  ‘The impact of poultry tariffs on competition’ (2013) 
22 G Brink ‘National interest in antidumping investigations’ (2009) 126 SALJ 316 p323 
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vertical or horizontal particularly in concentrated industries. The possibility of collusion 
is however not only limited to the local industry but it is also possible to use the threat 
of dumping investigations to compel foreign competitors to come into agreement with 
the local industry.23  
The narrow framework of anti-dumping legislation has led to a focus on the protection 
of the domestic industry at the expense of the downstream industries and consumers. 
When firms sell their products at low prices, consumers benefit from the lower prices 
and the imposition of anti-dumping duties results in consumers being adversely 
impacted by anti-dumping duties on imports. However supporters of anti-dumping 
regulation, argue that this benefit from low prices is not sustainable as the intention of 
‘dumping’ action is to destroy local competition and once a firm has succeeded in doing 
this, the firm pushes the prices higher. This increase in prices would then lead to a 
reduction in consumer welfare in the long term. In effect, supporters of anti-dumping 
regulation argue that these foreign firms are attempting to monopolise the local 
industry and imposing dumping duties protects the industry against this threat.  
This conflict between long term consumer interests and short term business interests 
has led to recommendations being put forward which include the possibility of a 
‘public interest clause’ in the anti-dumping regulation.24This is envisioned to improve 
the welfare effects of anti-dumping duties as consumer and downstream industries will 
be considered before final duties can be implemented. These recommendations were 
contained in a draft amendment to the South Africa anti-dumping legislation of 2006 
which included a national interest test. However this was not well received as it was 
considered to be ineffective in dealing with the issues that had been raised and also it 
                                                     
 
23 See Zanardi for a further discussion of this relationship between market participants 
24 M Wellhausen ‘The Community Interest Test in Antidumping Proceedings of the European Union’ 
(2001) AUILR volume 16 
   9 
 
 
was considered that there was not enough process and procedure put in place to 
monitor the application of the national interest test.25 
The act of ‘dumping’ is frowned upon because it is considered as ‘unfair’; because of 
this, most practitioners agree that there should be legislation to discourage and prevent 
this from happening. Dumping is deemed to be unfair because the foreign firms are 
considered to be selling products in the importing country at unfairly low prices.26  
However, anti-dumping regulation in its current form is inadequate to deal with the 
issues of unfair trade practices as it is open to abuse by domestic firms. The 
inconsistences between anti-dumping and competition law have led to calls for anti-
dumping to either be done away with or to have greater competition law principles 
included. This is to ensure that competition is protected in order to further facilitate the 
growth in trade rather than allow competition to be ‘chilled’ by the threat of anti-
dumping investigations. This discussion has become even more pertinent with the 
growth in global trade and the rapid removal of trade barriers across borders.  
In describing the anti-dumping agreement, ‘J. Michael Finger27 once portrayed the anti-
dumping regime as a “witches’ brew of the worst of policy making: power politics, bad 
economics, and shameful public administration.’’28 Alternatives to the anti-dumping 
remedy have been put forward, however the truth of the matter is that anti-dumping 
regulation is here to stay as there is no politically acceptable alternative to replace it 
with. Therefore the most efficient alternative is to amend the anti-dumping legislation 
                                                     
 
25 Brink op cit (23) 316 
26 Understanding the WTO: Agreements available from 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm accessed on 12 September 2015 
27 J Michael finger is a former Lead Economist and Chief, Trade Policy Research Group at the World 
Bank. He has also conducted seminal works on the WTO system. 
28 J. Finger, the origins and evolution of antidumping regulation 12-13 (trade policy Div., Country Econ 
Dep’t, the world bank, Working paper series No 783, 1991 cited in S. Cho Anticompetitive trade remedies: 
How antidumping measures obstruct market competition 87 N.C.L. Rev. 357 2008 -2009 p424 
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to accommodate and take into account the short comings in the regulations as 
previously discussed.    
‘Dumping is of two types: price discrimination dumping or sales below ‘cost’’29. 
Though there are minor differences between the two, they are treated the same if 
dumping is found to have occurred. ‘Dumping’ as a form of price discrimination can be 
short term or long term. Supporters of anti-dumping regulation argue that short term 
price discrimination is more detrimental to competition in the importing country as it is 
done to force competition out of the market.  Once that has been achieved, the prices are 
pushed up, thus having a detrimental effect on the importing industry.  It is also 
recognised that this can only be effective if the firm practising the price discrimination 
is dominant enough to cause material injury to the local industry. If the firm is not 
dominant then its price discriminating action will have minimal impact on the domestic 
industry of the importing country. Where dumping is of the price discrimination type, 
there is no reason why it should not fall under competition law which already deals 
with price discrimination.  However the direct application of competition principles to 
the regulation of ‘dumping’ would not be effective as the test and requirements for 
price discrimination under competition law are more stringent compared to the test 
under anti-dumping. Competition law requires that a price discriminating firm be 
dominant before its actions can be considered as conflicting with the law. On the other 
hand, anti-dumping regulation does not have such requirements and attempting to 
include it into the regulation would be insufficient and counterproductive as it would 
be difficult to prove dominance of foreign firms making it almost impossible to find for 
the domestic firm.30 
 
                                                     
 
29 AO Sykes and RN Cooper ‘Anti-dumping and antitrust: What problems does each address? [with 
comments and discussion] (1998) Brookings Trade Forum pp1-53, 13 
30 M Taylor ‘International Competition Law – A new dimension for the WTO?’ 2006 
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Due to the conflict between the practice of competition law and anti-dumping, in this 
paper, I recommend that changes are made to anti-dumping legislation to bring it in 
line with competition law which would have the effect of securing the loopholes that 
promote anti-competitive behaviour by domestic firms. The recommendations include: 
 The inclusion of competition law principles to compliment the anti-dumping 
investigations which include: 
 A market power threshold to prevent dominant domestic firms from 
abusing their market position and; 
 Strengthening of the test for ‘likeness’ to narrow the product scope. 
In order to achieve this, the paper further recommends greater cooperation and 
coordination between the trade and competition authorities. This would ensure that 
competition principles are taken into consideration in the practice of anti-dumping 
investigations, thereby increasing credibility and certainty for market participants 
seeking to do business across borders. 
These recommendations would make anti-dumping investigations more transparent as 
well as a more effective policy tool to protect the domestic market from unfair 
competition from international competitors. It is also crucial to ensure that policy 
changes that are implemented comply with the country’s obligations under the WTO. 
1.1. Background to trade remedies 
The growth in global trade coupled with the reduction in tariffs across borders has 
made it necessary to have an international perspective on the regulation of market 
participation by firms to ensure that the growth in ‘free trade’, 31- ‘an idea pioneered by 
Adam Smith (1723–1790), David Ricardo (1772–1823) and other classical economists,’32 
                                                     
 
31 The notion of ‘free trade’ is central to the existence of the WTO which seeks to remove trade barriers in 
order to encourage trade amongst member countries. 
32 Lumina op cit (n2) 24 
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does not result in the destruction of local industries. ‘Free trade is a market model in 
which trade of goods and services between countries flows unimpeded by government-
imposed tariff and non-tariff barriers.’33 The concept of free trade is the building block 
of the WTO. In the establishment of the WTO, the members sought to have an 
‘international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. The 
main function of the WTO is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and 
freely as possible.’34 
There are various forums under which the international operation of firms can be 
monitored for fair competition; however with 161 signatories and 22 other countries in 
the process of acceding to the WTO,35 the WTO has become the primary platform under 
which trade issues are negotiated and international trade disputes are resolved. The 
WTO ‘represents the confluence of, and sometimes the conflict between, three distinct 
areas of theory and practice (of) law, economics and politics.’36 Some of the 
developments that transpired before the WTO system could come into effect include the 
recognition that countries are sovereign (legal development), countries may extract 
mutual gain from freer trade with each other (economic development) and the 
emergence of a leader; Britain first followed by the United States of America (political 
development). However as markets have become increasingly open it is evident that the 
level of influence that governments have over their economies has also steadily 
declined. This has had the effect of reducing the ability of governments to protect the 
development of domestic markets. To stem this tide, the members agreed to the 
implementation of trade remedies to the GATT system of rules and regulations which 
                                                     
 
33 Lumina op cit (n2) 24 
34 The WTO in brief available from 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm, accessed on 10 September 
2015 
35 Understanding the WTO: The Organization available from 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed on 12 September 2015 
36 C VanGrasstek The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (2013) 3. 
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include anti-dumping regulations, countervailing measures as well as safeguard 
measures.  
 
Trade remedies are exceptions to the WTO principles of free trade. The procedures 
required for the implementation of trade remedies are unique to the WTO system in 
that ‘they give an active role to the business community. Governments seek trade 
remedies almost exclusively on the instigation of local business or because of business 
concerns.’37 Though there are three forms of trade remedies that the WTO allows, the 
focus of this paper is on anti-dumping regulation as regulated under section VI of 
GATT which ‘provides for the right of contracting parties to apply anti-dumping 
measures, i.e. measures against imports of a product at an export price below its 
‘normal value’ (usually the price of the product in the domestic market of the exporting 
country) if such dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry in the territory of 
the importing contracting party.’38  
The first anti-dumping legislation was enacted in Canada in 1904; and soon after, other 
countries followed similar routes with the Union of South Africa39 following with an 
anti-dumping law substantially the same as Canada’s in 1914.40 What is important to 
note is the reasoning behind the implementation of anti-dumping legislation at the 
beginning. Sykes contends that when the first anti-dumping legislations were put into 
place, the emphasis was on protecting the domestic market even though the language 
used suggested that there was economic rationale behind the legislation. This is 
captured in statements by Cooper, who in response to question of why anti-dumping 
and anti-trust are treated differently, argues that, ‘the answer, I believe is simple and 
                                                     
 
37 Trade remedies - What business needs to know available at http://www.tradeforum.org/Trade-
Remedies---What-Business-Needs-to-Know/ accessed on 14 March 2015 
38 Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 
39 Now known as the Republic of South Africa 
40 Sykes and Cooper op cit (n9) 16-17  
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straightforward: foreigners do not vote.’41In other words political considerations have 
kept anti-dumping legislation at the forefront of international and national discussions.  
Within the WTO, anti-dumping legislation was first included in the GATT 1947. 
Although the provisions were ‘relatively brief they represented an important start to a 
process of introducing detailed disciplines into the procedures used by member 
countries for the adoption of anti-dumping and countervailing action.’42 The anti-
dumping legislation was further developed in subsequent rounds43, with the Kennedy 
round introducing a code, the Turkey round improving on the code and the Uruguay 
round resulted in the anti-dumping agreement. The anti-dumping agreement from the 
Uruguay round was a negotiated agreement as all the countries had to agree on all the 
issues included in the GATT agreement before ceding to the WTO. One of the changes 
made to the anti-dumping legislation at this point was the requirement that the injury 
test be included in anti-dumping cases and that anti-dumping duties not exceed the 
amount of dumping determined to exist after an investigation of it.44 This change came 
about as a compromise to get the anti-dumping legislation into the GATT agreement.  
To date 11045 cases have been reported to the WTO dispute settlement body with 
Section VI (agreement on the implementation of anti-dumping) being cited as the 
reason for the dispute.  Both developed and developing countries have been users of 
anti-dumping measures. The guidelines from the WTO are very detailed in terms of 
defining the cost and prices to be used in assessing when and if dumping has occurred.  
There are substantive and procedural requirements relating to the notification, 
                                                     
 
41 Sykes and Cooper op cit (n9) 45 
42 P Bentley and A silberston Anti-dumping and Countervailing action – Limits imposed by economic 
and legal theory 1st ed (2007) 6. 
43 A trade round is a period of negotiations between members over specific issues. Since the inception of 
the GATT there have been eight trade rounds. 
44 Sykes and Cooper op cit (n9) 26 
45 Figures correct as at 03 October 2015. Figures Available from 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A6# accessed on 
03 October 2015 
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investigation as well as the imposing of the duties contained in the anti-dumping 
agreement.   
The substantive requirements in the anti-dumping agreement are covered in section 2 to 
section 4 of the agreement and they are: 
Determination of dumping – Section 2 
Determination of injury – Section 3 
Determination of industry – Section 4 
The procedural requirements relate to the administrative responsibilities when 
conducting investigations, imposing duties as well as the review procedures once 
duties have been imposed. These requirements are covered in section 5, section 7 to 9 
and sections 11 and 12 as per below: 
Initiation and conduct of investigations – Section 5 
Imposition of provisional measures – Section 7 
Price undertakings – Section 8 
Imposition and collection of duties – Section 9 
Duration, termination, and review of anti-dumping measures – Section 11 
Public notice – Section 12 
As a member of the WTO, South Africa’s anti-dumping legislation has to contain all the 
above substantive and procedural requirements in order to comply with its obligations 
to the WTO. 
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 Mr. Renato Ruggiero (former director general of the WTO from 1995 to 1999) at a 
conference on Anti-Trust noted the ‘urgent need for analysis of links between 
competition policy and trade policy.’46  At the same conference, he noted that the WTO 
has been working on introducing greater competition regulation into the negotiated 
agreement.  Domestic competition laws are meant to protect the market from unfair 
practices with the national competition act focusing on ‘economic activity within, or 
having an effect within, the republic’47.  On the other hand anti-dumping legislation is 
meant ‘to protect the domestic industries from injury caused by unfair international 
price discrimination.’48 According to section 3(2) of the anti-dumping agreement, 
dumping injury can take the form of price depression or prevent[ing] price increases 
which otherwise could have happened in the absence of the dumped goods49. In 
essence, anti-dumping action can be considered as anti-price discrimination action 
against a foreign competitor, as dumping occurs when a firm sells its products in the 
importing country at a lower value than the normal value in the exporting country, 
potentially damaging the domestic industry. Price discrimination is also regulated 
within domestic jurisdiction under competition law; however the prohibition only 
applies when it is conducted by a dominant firm50. Section D of article 8 further 
expounds the prohibition and states that, ‘it is prohibited for a dominant firm to – D (iv) 
sell[ing] goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost’51. Within both 
legislations there is an acknowledgement of the need to protect competition in order to 
facilitate the growth and development of the local industry. However whereas anti-
                                                     
 
46 Mr. Renato Ruggiero available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/rome1.htm 
accessed on 24 April 2015 At the time of the Speech Mr Ruggiero was the Director General of the WTO 
47 Competition act of 1998 subsec 3(1) 
48 KW Bagwell et al. Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade 1ed (2010) 198 
49 Agreement on implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 
Subsec 3(2) 
50 Competition act of 1998 subsection 8(d)(iv). 
51 Competition act of 1998 subsection 8 (d)(iv). 
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dumping legislation does not consider the market position of the firm in question, 
domestic competition law is focused on firms that are dominant within their markets. 
It is not mandatory to have anti-dumping legislation as it is not a requirement to impose 
anti-dumping duties.52 However should a country wish to impose anti–dumping duties  
the member country is required to do so in a manner which is consistent with section VI 
of GATT which states, ‘an anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the 
circumstances provided for in Article VI of  GATT 1994’.53 Failure to adhere to these 
conditions could result in the offending country being taken to the dispute settlement 
body (DSB)54 (see note for further information regarding the dispute settlement system of the 
WTO) of the WTO.  Section 17 of the anti-dumping agreement states that ‘except as 
otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is applicable 
to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.’55 The DSB is the 
body responsible for facilitating the settlement of disputes between WTO members. At 
the DSB an independent panel decides whether the member has complied or not with 
the relevant regulation. Consequently, the national anti-dumping articles are very 
similar to the WTO guidelines.   
The regulation of what are seemingly competition issues under WTO and domestic 
trade departments has come under criticism for possibly fostering collusive behaviour 
as well as disregarding consumer interests by focusing on protecting specific industries. 
                                                     
 
52 Agreement on implementation of article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade 1994 subsec 
9(1)  
53 Agreement on implementation of article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade 1994 s1 
54 The WTO dispute settlement system attempts to find the most amicable way of resolving conflict. To 
facilitate this, the first step in declaring a dispute is consultations between the members. It is hoped that 
the consultations will resolve the issue but if that does not happen, then one of the parties can request for 
a panel to be established. The panel hears the dispute and makes a ruling based on the evidence 
presented. If either party is not satisfied, they can resort to the appellate body for a review of the decision. 
The decision of the appellate body is final. For further information on the function of the WTO DSB 
please consult www.wto.org 
55 Agreement on implementation of article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade of 1994 s 17 
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This interplay between competition and trade has led to suggestions that rather than the 
WTO regulating dumping and anti-dumping actions, competition networks need to be 
strengthened to allow them to effectively deal with the challenge of international 
competition. 
Some have argued56 that the WTO is not the appropriate platform to discuss and 
monitor competition related issues as it is primarily a trade body. The argument is that 
competition issues should rather be contained under competition regulation with a 
focus on building a strong international competition network. In light of this, there has 
been a call to further empower international competition networks which include the 
International Competition Network (ICN) which is an informal meeting place to discuss 
best practices in competition law, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
Development (OECD) whose mission ‘is to promote policies that will improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world’57 and United Nations 
Centre for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) whose mission is to ‘ensure that partner 
countries enjoy the benefits of increased competition, open and contestable markets, 
private sector investment in key sectors and ultimately that consumers achieve 
improved welfare.’58  It is argued that these organisations are less prone to the 
politicking that is ingrained in the WTO due to the negotiation custom of the WTO and 
consequently would be more effective in dealing with the challenges of international 
competition. 
In spite of the complimentary nature of anti-dumping and competition law, most 
countries have two separate authorities dealing with competition law and anti-
                                                     
 
56 The U.S. has continued to resist the inclusion of further competition issues in the WTO were the 
European Union has been calling for not only the inclusion of competition but also the amendment to the 
anti-dumping instrument. 
57 Our mission The OECD, available from http://www.oecd.org/about/ accessed on 21 April 2015 
58 Mission UNCTAD, available from 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/Competition-Law-and-Policy.aspx?Ev=21,10 
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dumping action. South Africa is not an exception to this, with the Competition 
Commission dealing with competition issues including price discrimination and 
collusion59, and anti–dumping regulation under ITAC dealing with unfair price 
discrimination from beyond the borders60.  
2. How is dumping regulated 
2.1. SA anti-dumping legislation 
South Africa was one of the first countries to use anti-dumping measures. However 
what existed as anti-dumping regulation in 1914 has subsequently changed to the 
current legislation which came into effect in 2003. Within the South African legislation, 
anti-dumping is regulated by the department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
division responsible for the monitoring and conducting of investigations related to anti-
dumping complaints is the International Trade and Administration Commission 
(ITAC). In 2003 the International Trade and Administration Act (ITAA of 2002) which 
established the ITAC came into effect.  The ITAA sets out the functions of ITAC which 
include monitoring import and export activities.61 One of the key objectives set out in 
the ITAA of 2002 is the fostering of economic growth and development in order to raise 
incomes62, which potentially generates a conflict between the competition and economic 
objectives.  In November 2003 the latest SA anti-dumping regulations were published 
under the ITAC by the minister of Trade and Industry at the time, Alec Erwin.63 
Chapter 3 of ITAA sets out the functions of the commission with one of the functions 
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60 Anti-dumping regulations notice 3197 of 2003 
61 International Trade and Administration Act of 2002 Section 7 
62 International Trade and Administration Act of 2002 Section 2 
63 Anti-dumping regulations Notice 3197 of 2003 
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being to oversee the implementation of customs duties, anti-dumping duties, 
countervailing duties and safeguard duties64.   
South Africa is part of a customs union; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland65. As dumping occurs as a result of 
goods entering into the borders of another country, South Africa’s participation in 
SACU has  necessitated the incorporation of the SACU members in its administration of 
anti-dumping investigations and monitoring. To this effect, there has been a gradual 
move towards bringing anti-dumping legislation under SACU administration to ensure 
that all members are fairly represented. Currently, ITAC states that any SACU industry 
can apply to ITAC if they want to initiate an investigation related to dumping into the 
community. The ITAA recognising the need to streamline the anti-dumping regulations 
with the SACU industry establishes for the sharing of information with other SACU 
members, as well as establishing relations with SACU institutions and SACU member 
countries. The ITAA as well as the SA anti-dumping regulations define industry with 
SACU in mind. Within the SA anti-dumping regulation, the domestic industry is 
defined as: 
‘…the domestic producers in the SACU as a whole of the like products or those of them 
whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products.’66 
In effect, ITAC establishes SACU as the domestic market and becomes responsible not 
only for complaints instigated by South African industries but also industries in the 
SACU member countries. However, within SACU, South Africa is the main trade 
partner with most of the export within the community going to South Africa. South 
                                                     
 
64 International Trade and Administration Act of 2002 Part B (16)  
65 SACU membership, available at http://www.sacu.int/, accessed on 10 March 2015 
66 Anti-dumping regulations notice 3197 of 2003 s1  
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Africa is also the main exporter within the region.67 This implies that with most of the 
business within the region centred around South Africa and coming from South African 
companies, the notion of domestic industry is still largely centred on South Africa. 
As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), South Africa’s anti-dumping 
measures have to be in line with the guidelines provided by the WTO. Section 9 of the 
anti-dumping regulation states that: 
‘The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all 
requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the 
amount of the anti-dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of 
dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing 
Member.  It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all 
Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be 
adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.’68 
This places the onus on the member state to not only decide whether or not to impose 
duties but also how much to impose as a duty within the confines of the margin of 
dumping.  
As anti-dumping proceedings are instigated on the assumption that a competitive 
domestic industry is facing a foreign monopolist or an international cartel, the focus on 
the investigation is proving that the price that the foreign firm is charging is anti-
competitive by either significantly price undercutting69 the domestic market or where 
the effect of the import pricing is of the effect of price depression of the domestic 
                                                     
 
67 Merchandise trade statistics 2012, available at 
http://www.sacu.int/publications/trade_statistics/2012/merchandise_trade_statistics12.pdf, accessed 
on 10 March 2015 
68 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 subsec 
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3(2)  
   22 
 
 
market. This was tested before the appellate body of the DSB in the China Grain 
Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel (GOES) case between China and the United States.  
2.2. China GOES 2013 
A significant case within the WTO that helped to shape the terms contained within the 
anti-dumping regulation was brought before the DSB on 15 September 2010 when the 
United States of America requested consultations with China with respect to measures 
imposing countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties on grain oriented flat-rolled 
electrical steel (‘GOES’) from the United States of America as set forth in the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China (‘MOFCOM’) Notice No. 21 [2010], 
including its annexes70. In their request, the United States of America argued that China 
had not properly followed the anti-dumping requirements of proving the cause and 
effect of the material injury to the domestic industry from the imports coming into the 
country. The issue at hand was whether it was necessary to show a cause and effect or if 
it was sufficient to just show that the industry was suffering material injury. 
According to the anti-dumping agreement, the domestic industry has to show that the 
pricing of the import industry has the effect of causing or threatens injury to an 
established domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry. The anti-dumping agreement further expounds on the test of material injury 
with section 3 setting out the determination of injury. Subsection 3(1) states that the test 
for material injury has to be based on positive information and there has to be an 
objective examination of: 
                                                     
 
70 China GOES – WTO dispute settlement available from 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds414_e.htm, accessed on 3 May 2015 
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‘both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on 
prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these 
imports on domestic producers of such products.’71 
 This is further explained in subsections 3(2) and 3(5) which state the requirements for 
the investigative process. The anti-dumping agreement however does not prescribe the 
specifics on the methodology to be followed in the investigations; however, the anti-
dumping agreement does make clear the procedural requirements mandatory before 
definitive duties can be imposed.  Where subsection 3(1) requires there to be injury 
before investigations can commence, subsection 3(2) requires the domestic industry to 
show that there has been a significant increase in dumped imports with the effect of 
causing injury to the domestic market. Subsection 3(5) then requires the investigating 
authorities to show that the increase in the dumped imports has caused the injury. 
Causality has to be demonstrated based on the examination of all the relevant factors 
including, ‘any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time 
are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must 
not be attributed to the dumped imports.’72 Section 3 as a whole therefore requires an 
investigating authority to test out and determine the question of material injury to the 
domestic market as well as to show causality between the dumped imports and the 
injury to the domestic industry before imposing any dumping duties.  
In their request for consultations with China on GOES, the United States of America 
alleged that China when imposing the anti-dumping duties on GOES from the United 
States of America had not followed the procedural and the evidentiary requirements of 
the anti-dumping agreement. Specifically, ‘the United States challenged China’s 
                                                     
 
71 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 subsec 
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findings of price effects under subsections 3(1) and 3(2) of the anti-dumping agreement 
and the causation analysis under subsections 3(1) and 3(5) of the anti-dumping 
agreement’73. In June 2012 the panel found that China had acted inconsistently with 
section 3(1) and section 3(5) of the anti-dumping agreement. China decided to appeal to 
the Appellate Body (AB) on the basis that the panel’s findings on section 3(2) and 
section 3(5) of the anti-dumping agreement were based on an incorrect interpretation of 
the phrase ‘the effect of’ contained in section 3(1) of the anti-dumping agreement ‘to 
mean that an investigating authority must demonstrate that adverse price effects were 
caused by dumped and/ or subsidized imports.’74 In their submissions, China also 
criticised the fact that in their decision, the panel had concluded that it was not 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 3(2) and section 3(5) by simply showing 
that there was price depression in the domestic market but that rather, a causality effect 
had to be shown.   
In their response to the claims by both the United States of America and China, the 
Appellate Body noted that section 3(1) of the anti-dumping agreement ‘is an 
overarching provision that sets forth a member’s fundamental, substantive obligation 
with respect to the injury determination, and informs the more detailed obligations in 
succeeding paragraphs.’75 Furthermore, the term ‘positive evidence’ concerns the 
quality of the information used to come to a decision, the information needs to be 
‘affirmative, objective, verifiable, and credible.’76, and that the investigations needed to 
be conducted in a manner that was fair without showing any favour to the ‘interests of 
                                                     
 
73 China countervailing and Anti-dumping duties on Grain oriented Flat Rolled electrical Steel from the 
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74 China countervailing and Anti-dumping duties on Grain oriented Flat Rolled electrical Steel from the 
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any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation.’77 The 
Appellate Body also emphasised the need to show causality between the price 
depression and the increase in the dumped imports. The Appellate Body further stated 
that it would not be enough just to show a declining trend in domestic prices or for that 
effect to show that prices have not risen when they could have, rather an investigating 
authority has to assess ‘domestic prices in conjunction with subject imports in order to 
understand whether subject imports have explanatory force for the occurrence of 
significant depression or suppression of domestic prices’78  
In their concluding remarks, the Appellate Body noted that it was ‘not sufficient for an 
authority to confine its consideration to what is happening to domestic prices alone for 
purposes of the inquiry stipulated in Article 3(2)’79 but it was necessary to consider 
what was happening to the domestic prices in conjugation with the imports to 
determine if there was a cause and effect between the two. This requirement for 
causality between the price effect and dumped imports in the domestic market means 
that investigating authorities are required to be more rigorous in their analysis of 
dumping investigations before applying any dumping duties.  
The China GOES case established the importance of following the procedural 
requirements in investigating dumping complaints. The report of the Appellate Body 
further expressed the necessity of meeting the causality test contained in section 3 of the 
anti-dumping agreement. However the question of what constituted material injury 
was not addressed, leaving the text of the anti-dumping agreement as the primary 
guide of what constituted material injury. In other words, if an importing country could 
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show the causality between imports and price depression of the like product in the 
domestic market, it would constitute dumping without giving regard to the efficiencies 
in the exporting country. This focus on the domestic industry suggests that domestic 
industries can obtain protection from more efficient foreign competitors whilst 
continuing to operate in an inefficient manner. The ‘chicken wars’ within South Africa 
have been an illustration of this challenge. 
2.2.1. Chicken wars – anti dumping or protection 
Within South Africa a dumping case that has been of interest not just to the domestic 
market in question but also to the downstream market and interested community 
groups including the Competition Commission is related to dumping duties on 
imported chicken firstly from the United States of America and more recently from 
Brazil. In 1999 Rainbow Farms supported by the South African Poultry Association 
(SAPA) applied to the Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT)80 to have dumping duties 
imposed on chicken imports from the United States of America alleging that the United 
States of America was dumping chicken into the South African market. The period 
under investigation was from August 1998 to July 1999 and in July 2000, the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade imposed preliminary duties on the chicken leg portions from the 
United States. The investigation was finalised in December of 2000, with the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade deciding that the United States of America were indeed dumping 
chicken quarters into the market and also that the South African poultry market had 
experienced and was in threat of material harm due to the dumping of chicken pieces 
from the United States of America.81 
In their argument the South African Poultry industry alleged that the United States of 
America was dumping chicken pieces into the South African market based on the fact 
that the prices of the chicken pieces were lower than the net price of producing a 
                                                     
 
80 The Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT) is a precursor to ITAC which came into existence in 2003 
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chicken in the United States. Kulkarni in his analysis of the United States of America 
chicken market argued that the United States of America chicken market at the time of 
the investigation was the biggest producer of chicken having the best climate for 
chicken production82. He also points out that were as the South African market 
preferred the dark meat parts (leg quarters), the United States market preferred the 
breast meat section making it the portion in high demand and consequently fetching a 
higher price in the United States of America. On this basis, the chicken producers in the 
United States of America were prepared to sell the dark meat portions at a lower price 
as they were able to recoup the cost balance from the breast meat sections. However in 
the South African market, there is a higher preference for dark meat and it fetches a 
higher price than what it would in the United States of America making South Africa a 
suitable export market for the United States of America chicken producers. 
In their response to the Board on Tariffs and Trade, to account for the price differential 
between dark meat sold in South Africa and dark meat sold in the United States of 
America, the United States  of America chicken producers stated that they used the ‘net 
realisable value’83 as a cost basis. In other words, rather than apportioning cost to 
different portions of the chicken, the United States chicken industry considered the cost 
of the whole chicken and applied the same methodology in apportioning the value to 
the different pieces. Effectively, the United States of America chicken producers 
considered the cost of producing the whole chicken and also the net amount realised 
from the sale of the chicken rather than apportioning cost to different parts of the 
chicken.  On supplying this information to the Board on Tariffs and Trade, this method 
of accounting for cost was rejected and instead the Board on Tariffs and Trade 
‘determined that the appropriate way to reallocate costs was by weight…A cost was 
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assigned to each cut of the bird, regardless of the type of meat (dark or white).’84 
Because of this difference in accounting for cost, the Board on Tariffs and Trade 
concluded that the United States chicken exporters were importing chicken into South 
Africa at a price lower than the cost of production in the United States of America, 
hence satisfying the first requirement of the anti-dumping agreement, which is selling 
an imported product below its normal value in the country of export. 
On the basis that the volume of chicken leg quarters from the United States of America 
had increased, the ‘Board found that the South African poultry industry had 
experienced material injury (in the form of depressed prices) and that they were threatened 
with further injury if the United States was allowed to continue to export leg quarters 
into the South African market’.85 Consequently the recommendation was put forward to 
impose anti-dumping duties on chicken from the United States of America.  
The United States of America chicken dumping duties was the beginning of a long 
stream of other anti-dumping duties on chicken imports from other countries. In 2003 
the South African Poultry Association approached ITAC to request for increased duties 
on frozen poultry offal from Brazil. In the application, the applicants claimed that the 
‘SACU market is being flooded with imports at an annualised level of 20 per cent of 
domestic production, harming the industry’.86 In the application, there is clear mention 
of the increase in competition from imports from Brazil, however it is also clear that the 
increase in competition is not due to dumping; that is pricing below cost, but rather the 
fact that the South African chicken producers are inefficient in comparison to their 
international counterparts. In the discussion it is mentioned that ‘Brazil has been 
identified as a country which due to low price input cost, and currency devaluation is a 
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big threat’87 to the domestic industry. After presentations from interested parties, the 
commission decided to impose duties on ‘poultry offal classifiable under tariff heading 
subheading 0207.14.20 from free of duty to 27 per cent ad valorem’88. However the 
application for an increase in duty on whole frozen poultry and poultry (bone-in) leg 
quarters was rejected. This increase in duty meant that all frozen chicken from Brazil 
would be charged import duty whereas previously frozen chicken offal were imported 
free of duty. 
In March 2013 the SAPA once again requested for an increase on duty on frozen chicken 
imports. The application was made specifically on ‘carcases, whole bird, boneless cuts, 
offal, and bone-in portions.’89 In their application the SAPA stated that the producers in 
the SACU region were in a ‘distressed financial state’90, they asserted that the cause of 
the financial distress was the ‘large and rapid increase in the volume of imports of 
extremely low priced poultry meat’91. This they said had led to the closing down of 
small and medium sized firms. The SAPA also mentioned that due to the low priced 
imports; investments were being negatively impacted ‘adversely affecting both 
commercial and emerging broiler producers, as well as SACU production capacity and 
SACU food security’92  
As part of the investigative process, interested parties were consulted in line with the 
SA anti-dumping regulations which define the interested parties as:  
a) Producers within SACU; 
b) Exporters; 
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c) Foreign producers; 
d) Importers; 
e) Trade or business associations whose members are SACU or foreign producers, 
exporters or importers; and/ or 
f) The governments of the countries of origin of export…93 
This definition is however not all inclusive as the ITAC has the authority to seek and 
accept input from other parties, as the ITAC is not precluded from accepting other 
parties as interested parties at its discretion.94 
The parties that were consulted included the department of trade and Industry (The 
DTI), Association of Meat Importers and Exporters (AMIE), retailers and the 
Department of Agriculture Forestry and fisheries (DAFF), amongst others. AMIE in 
their comments to the commission noted that the prices of imported chicken were in 
actual fact higher than domestic selling prices which meant that they were not 
depressing the prices of locally produced chicken. However the ITAC in their response 
noted that it was important to ‘give consideration to a country being able to produce a 
strategic protein source but at affordable prices… [And] A balance between the viability 
of domestic producers of a strategic industry with the affordability of food for the lower 
income group is critical for food security’95 
After the investigation, the commission recommended an increase of duty on chicken 
imports. The biggest increase was on whole bird cuts with an increase of over 200 per 
cent in import duty.  
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Tariff subheading product Existing duty Recommended 
Duty 
0207.12.90 Whole bird 27% 82% bound rate96 
0207.14.10 Boneless cuts 5% 12% 
0207.14.90 Bone-in portions 18% (220c/kg) 37% 
0207.14.20 Offal 27% 30% 
0207.12.20 Carcasses 27% 31% 
Source: Report no.44297 
SACU chicken industry 
As part of the investigation into the dumping allegations, the ITAC did an analysis of 
the chicken industry. According to the ITAC, the top five producers account for 
approximately 50 per cent98 of the SACU industry and these producers are: 
 Rainbow Farms Ltd 
 Astral Operations Ltd 
 Sovereign Food Investments Ltd 
 AFGRI Poultry Ltd; and  
 Supreme Poultry Ltd (Country Bird Holdings) 
The South African market is approximated to constitute up to 90 per cent of the SACU 
production. At the time of the report, the chicken industry accounted for close to 23 per 
cent of all agricultural production, representing R22.9 billion for chicken meat output 
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and R6.7 billion for eggs output. According to Shane, with six producers making up 
close to 65 per cent of the industry, the South African chicken industry is an oligopoly.99 
The ITAC’s report also showed that the SACU chicken industry faces high costs of 
production, with feed costs which include maize and soya accounting for 65 per cent to 
70 per cent100 of the total cost of production. In his book Shane highlights further 
inefficiencies in the chicken industry which make them uncompetitive; these include a 
poorly trained workforce, poor disease management, high transportation cost and 
further compounding the problem, high shipping and packaging cost.101  
Whereas the United States of America market prefers the white meat portions of 
chicken, the SACU market prefers the ‘bone-in portions which are sold as individually 
quick frozen (IQF) products known as ‘braai packs’102. The slaughter period for chicken 
is between 28 to 35 days, which is in contrast with the developed markets like United 
States of America where the slaughter period is up to 42 days to accommodate the 
further growth necessary for the breast meat to fully develop to the right size for the 
market.  
The ITAC report also stated that, ‘consumption of poultry meat in South Africa grew at 
a faster rate than domestic production’103 in the period under investigation. This adds 
weight to the argument that the South African poultry industry was not suffering injury 
as a result of the dumped imports but rather inefficiencies in their production processes. 
These inefficiencies make the poultry industry uncompetitive relative to international 
competitors like the United States of America and Brazil making the industry a target 
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for international firms as they can receive higher prices by exporting to South Africa 
than they would in their domestic markets.  
2.3. Draft amendments to the SA anti-dumping regulation 
In 2006, draft amendments to the anti-dumping regulations were published. The 
introductory notes to the draft amendment to the SA anti-dumping regulation state 
that, the proposed changes are ‘informed by the Commission’s past and current 
experiences in administering this trade remedy instrument’.104 From that vantage point 
the commission made recommendations for changes to the SA anti-dumping regulation 
and of interest were the changes to the: 
 requirements to initiate investigations, 
 calculation of material injury, 
 provision for the consideration of public interest, 
 as well as a change in the verification procedures which according to the 
commission was to reflect ‘that it is not always feasible for the commission to 
verify all information submitted by interested parties, given the commission’s 
limited resources.’105 
 Brink in a commentary on the proposed amendments summarises that the proposed 
changes would have the effect of making it much harder to lodge complaints with 
ITAC. 106This challenge is reflected in the proposed requirements for the determination 
of injury which requires a higher threshold of firms submitting comments before an 
investigation can commence. In the current anti-dumping regulations, there is an 
                                                     
 
104 Draft Amended Anti-dumping Regulations: For public comments, 2932 of 2006, s1 
105 Draft Amended Anti-dumping Regulations: For public comments, 2932 of 2006, Part C (18) 
106 G Brink ‘Proposed amendments to the anti-dumping regulations: are the amendments in order? (2006) 
Tralac 16 
   34 
 
 
effective requirement of 25 per cent of the industry107, the proposed amendments add 
that if an industry has more than one firm with more than 35 per cent of the market 
share, then all the firms with more 35 per cent are required to make a submission of 
injury, should all such firms not provide information then the ITAC will not initiate an 
investigation.108 In the explanatory notes to the changes, the ITAC state that this change 
addresses industries where there might just be two firms and one firm submits injury 
information making it difficult to assess whether the injury is due to dumping or to 
industry competition.  
However, the requirement for a higher threshold of firms submitting an opinion can be 
considered as further entrenching the need for collusion in industries seeking protection 
from more competitive imports. The introduction of dumping duties on imported 
products benefits the industry at large and not just one firm. This provides an incentive 
for firms to collude in order to have an application for the initiation of anti-dumping 
investigation accepted by the ITAC. Due to the possible cost in applying for the anti-
dumping duties as well as the possibility of the ‘free riding’109 problem it would not be 
efficient nor very beneficial for one firm in a concentrated industry to take on all the 
charges as success in getting the required anti-dumping duties imposed on the imports 
would benefit all the firms in the industry. This therefore incentivises firms to come to 
agreement when making anti-dumping applications which potentially causes problems 
of collusion amongst firms.   
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The amendments also make further restrictions on the firms that can initiate anti-
dumping investigations by adding that firms that perform assembly operations would 
not be considered as part of SACU industry. In the current regulations the firms that are 
able to apply for the initiation of dumping investigations are producers: 
 Related to the importer, exporter or the foreign producer; or 
 Itself an importer of the product under investigation110 
However with the amendment, firms that operate assembly operations would be 
directly included in the SACU industry definition of the SA anti-dumping regulations. 
According to the draft amendments, a firm would be performing assembly operations 
where the value added by its operations within SACU is less than 25 per cent of the 
direct and indirect costs of production only.111 Other costs including administrative, 
general, packaging, selling and profit112 would not count towards the value added. In 
essence the amendment seeks to protect the domestic industry by ensuring that firms 
related to the industry in question have access to the system of redress through the anti-
dumping regulations.   
The other key change contained in the draft amendment pertains to the inclusion of 
public interest in the SA anti-dumping regulations. According to the draft anti-
dumping regulation, section 20 ‘provides for the consideration of public interest in 
Commission investigation or reviews’.113  According to the draft amendments the 
investigation would include consideration of a number of factors which include the 
availability of ‘commercially substitutable products in commercial quantities’114 as well 
as the impact on competition that the anti-dumping duties will have on: 
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 Domestic goods or services 
 Domestic producers 
 Domestic downstream market and 
 Consumer access to goods at competitive prices 
In the instance that the ITAC determines that the anti-dumping duties will have a 
negative impact on public welfare, then the commission will recommend that the lesser 
duties be applied or ‘anti-dumping duties not be imposed, amended or continued’115 
The provision on public interest means that a broader perspective is taken when 
dumping investigations are being undertaken. Brink however amongst others argue 
that the inclusion of the public interest clause is not necessary as the requirement in the 
anti-dumping regulation for lesser duty contained in section 9(1) which states that 
where dumping duties are imposed, ‘the duty be less than the margin if such lesser 
duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry’116 already 
serves as protection for consumer interest. 
3. Competition law and the SA competition regulation 
‘Competition law’ may be perceived as a policy instrument premised on microeconomic 
theory in which the government deliberately intervenes in the economy to enhance 
market efficiency by correcting market failures.’117 Competition law is meant to protect 
the competitive process by ensuring that market participants do not abuse their 
dominant position and by preventing collusive practises in horizontal and vertical 
markets. These tendencies are considered to prevent the proper functioning of a free 
market and they are also reflective of the existence of an imperfect market. It is with this 
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in mind that governments have seen it fit to have regulation in place to monitor and 
regulate competition between firms. It is important to note that competition law is not 
meant to protect the competitor but rather to protect competition. According to 
Taylor118, the protection of competition is achieved by utilising two forms of regulation, 
that is, behavioural and structural regulation. ‘Behavioural regulation’ seeks to prevent 
market participants from engaging in behaviour which seeks to increase market power 
by engaging in anti-competitive practises and ‘structural regulation’ seeks to prevent 
firms from merging in a ‘manner that unduly increases their market power’.119 Taylor 
further expounds that competition law uses a blend of structural and behavioural 
regulation which include anti-monopoly, concerted conduct and merger laws to 
regulate competition between firms.120  
Within South Africa, competition issues are regulated under the Competition Act of 
1998 (competition act)121. The competition act establishes the organs responsible for 
monitoring and adjudication of competition related matters. These organs are the 
Competition Commission, ‘responsible for the investigation, control and evaluation of 
restrictive practices, abuse of dominant position, and mergers’122; the Competition 
Tribunal (Tribunal), ‘responsible to adjudicate such matters’123; and the Competition 
Appeal Court.  According to the competition act, price depression and price 
discrimination activity undertaken by a dominant firm are regulated under section 9 
which is titled ‘price discrimination by a dominant firm prohibited’124.  Price 
discrimination is defined as applying, ‘dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
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with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’.125 On 
the other hand price predation is regulated under subsection 8(d)(iv) of the competition 
act and  ‘is achieved by the predator’s setting prices sufficiently low to reduce 
competitors’ ability or incentives to compete effectively or to exclude them from the 
market’126. Predation is particularly harmful when practised by a dominant firm in the 
short run with the prospect of increasing prices in the long run. 
3.1. Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is the act of differentiating between buyers and then charging them 
different prices accordingly. In economic terms, there is nothing wrong with price 
discrimination and it can actually have the effect of increasing consumer welfare if a 
supplier is able to effectively segregate between the different buyers and charge them 
different prices accordingly. Posner quoted in Geradin states that, ‘price discrimination 
is a term the economists use to describe the practice of selling the same product to 
different customers at different prices even though the cost of sale is the same to each of 
them. More precisely, it is selling at a price or prices such that the ratio of price to 
marginal costs is different in different sales…’127 
 
Where collusion is not dependent on firm size, price discrimination is only prohibited 
when it is conducted by a dominant firm. Accordingly, price discrimination is dealt 
with under section 9(1) of the competition act which states that price discrimination by 
a dominant firm is prohibited if it (a) is likely to have the effect of lessening competition 
and (b) relates to the sale, in equivalent transactions. Price discrimination by a dominant 
firm is not a per se prohibition as subsection (9)(2) provides for a defence for subsection 
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(9)(1) offences. According to subsection 9(2) a firm is able to discriminate in prices if it 
can show that the difference in price: 
a. makes allowances for differences in cost or likely cost resulting from difference 
in location, quantities or method of delivery to different purchasers. 
b. is a way to meet a price or benefit offered by a competitor or;  
c. is in response to a change in market conditions for the goods or services 
concerned.128 
In the South African context, a firm is considered to be dominant if: 
(a) It has at least 45 per cent of that market; 
(b) It has at least 35 per cent, but less than 45 per cent, of that market, unless it can show 
that it does not have market power; or 
(c) It has less than 35 per cent of that market, but has market power.129 
In effect the competition act establishes any firm with over 45 per cent market share as 
automatically having market power; however this is not always the case. Flynn and 
Stratford state that the test for market power which has been laid down is a position 
that: 
‘…enables it [a firm] to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers’130 
 
In Harmony Gold v Mittal SA131, it was reiterated that for a firm to be able to charge an 
excessive price, the firm would need to have sufficient market power to behave 
independently with no realistic prospects of entry – in other words the market should 
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be both ‘uncontested and incontestable.’132 Where perfect competition exists in the 
market, a firm is not able to charge a price that is independent of the market as 
consumers would simply default to the cheaper firms, at the same time; there is no 
incentive for firms to charge a lower price as they can achieve the same sales at a higher 
price. Therefore firms can only divert from the market price if the market is imperfect 
and  the firm in question is ‘of overwhelming size relative to the market in which they 
are located and which are, in addition, markets characterised by unusually high entry 
barriers.’133 
 
Once it has been shown that a firm is discriminating on price, the complainant needs to 
show that there has been significant lessening of competition. However, the 
requirement to show a significant lessening of competition as per section 9(1)(a) makes 
it difficult to satisfy the conditions for a price discrimination charge.  This challenge was 
encountered in Sasol v Nationwide Poles,134 as Nationwide Poles sought to show that 
price discrimination practiced by Sasol was having the effect of harming their ability to 
compete. Nationwide Poles failed to prove harm to the industry but rather was able to 
show harm to their own business which is not sufficient as the focus is on the industry 
not individual firms. In a presentation to the ICN, Trudy Makhaya noted that ‘Small 
business (are) intrinsically unable to show generalised harm given [their] limited role in 
any market’135, however as Sasol was unable to show pro-competitive arguments for the 
price discrimination, the Tribunal found for Nationwide Poles. Sasol went on to contest 
the decision by the Tribunal at the Competition Appeal Court were the Appeal Court 
found that Nationwide Poles had failed to show harm to the industry.  The challenge in 
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assessing the significant lessening of competition is that competition legislation is meant 
to ‘protect competition, not competitors’136 and yet as the tribunal in this instance (Sasol 
v Nationwide Poles) responded that, ‘no competitors, no competition.’137 The 
competitive process is protected by protecting individual competitors.  
 
In order to evaluate the effect of competition of the price discrimination act, an analysis 
needs to be done of the market. Once the market has been defined, the market position 
of the firm in question is considered as it is recognised that dominance is required to 
significantly hinder competition. To subsequently test for the significant lessening of 
competition, an analysis can be done of the number of firms that have left (failed 
businesses) the market in the relevant period of the price discrimination charge.  
However the challenge with this method is proving beyond reasonable doubt that the 
failed firms have not done so due to inefficiency in other areas. Hence the test of 
substantial lessening of competition makes this hurdle tremendously high to apply in 
most instances. This is further compounded when considering the effect on competition 
from a foreign firm whose market is both domestic and international, therefore 
expanding the market under consideration.  
3.2. Predation or Price below cost 
Within the South African legislation, predation is regulated under section 8(d)(iv) of the 
competition act which states that a dominant firm is prohibited from charging prices 
that are below the firm’s marginal or average variable cost (AVC).138 Contravening 
section 8(d)(iv) is considered as a rule of reason contravention therefore a firm can show 
that the act of pricing below the average cost was due to ‘technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gains’.139 Subsection 8(c) of the Competition Act is considered as 
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a ‘catch all’ for exclusionary acts practiced by a dominant firm. In Competition 
Commission v Media 24140, the Competition Commission highlighted that section 
8(d)(iv) was considered an ‘express predation’ contravention, where section 8(c) was 
considered a ‘general exclusionary’ contravention. A key differential between a 
complaint under subsection 8(c) and subsection 8(d)(iv) is that ‘the complainant in an 
8(d) matter is not required to prove the conduct “impedes or prevents a firm entering 
into, or expanding within, a market” in order to establish that the conduct is indeed 
exclusionary. All that is required is to prove the existence of the elements of the practice 
in question.’141 In this case to meet the requirements for predation under section 
8(d)(iv), the complainant needs to show that: 
 the price charged by the firm is below its marginal or average variable cost 
(AVC)  
However where a complainant is unable to satisfy the conditions under subsection 
8(d)(iv), they can still show predatory intent under subsection 8(c) if  the complainant 
firm ‘adduces additional evidence of predation beyond mere evidence of costs’.142 The 
additional evidence under subsection 8(c) includes: 
 Intent; that is, was the action taken by the firm ‘part of a plan for eliminating a 
competitor perhaps as efficient as the dominant undertaking’143 
 Whether the complainant firm is an equally efficient competitor. 
 Evidence of recoupment   
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Evidence of the above would be an indicator of the presence of predation. Recognising 
the challenges in proving that the price charged by a firm is below its average cost, 
subsection 8(c) allows for alternative method of calculating cost which include average 
avoidable cost’ (AAC). The AAC method has been used in other jurisdictions and is 
considered a ‘“but for” concept. The important difference with AVC, is that AAC 
includes an element of fixed costs…thus making the fixed/variable quandary more 
manageable.’144This adjustment however does not remove the challenges in obtaining 
and calculating the cost of the firm as noted by Padilla and O‘Donoghue that ‘further 
practical experience with cost based rules is that they are often complex to apply in 
practice, in particular for multiproduct firms… A recoupment analysis helps provide a 
cross-check, based on market structure or conduct, on whether the inference of 
predation is credible.’145 
In the case of South African law, the recoupment test is not considered as a necessity as 
the foundation for a predation case is dominance. ‘Evidence of recoupment thus serves 
as a useful circumstantial evidence of the existence of predation, and is a useful 
controlling factor to avoid the type II errors that may be associated with the ‘pricing 
above AVC or AAC but below ATC test.’146 A type II error is a ‘false negative’ which 
arises from ‘under-prosecution’.147 
On the matter of intent, the analysis can be direct or indirect and attempts to look at the 
motive behind business decisions. The examination of intent can however not stand 
alone as it is fraught with challenges as noted in Competition Commission v Media 24 
where the analysis of the literature on intent showed challenges that can be encountered 
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when focusing on intent. One of the challenges is that the concept of ‘intent’ is 
ambiguous on the basis that a firm in competition is inherently trying to gain more 
business from their competitors which is part of the business strategy, and not anti-
competitive. On this basis, it is recommended that the analysis of intent be ‘recognise[d] 
as a source of circumstantial evidence, but that needs to be assessed against other 
sources of evidence.’148 
All these challenges were encountered when the Competition Commission took Media 
24 to the Tribunal for a charge of predation against a competitor in the Welkom region. 
In the speech announcing the outcome of the case between the Competition 
Commission and Media 24, the Tribunal noted that ‘this is the first time in the sixteen 
years in which the new Competition Act has been in operation that a firm has been 
found guilty of predatory pricing.’149 The statement by the Competition Commission 
reflects the challenges inherent when prosecuting predation related contraventions.  
3.3. Collusive action 
Most experts agree that there is need for some level of cooperation between businesses, 
however the same cooperation is abhorrent to competition as it reduces the level of 
rivalry between firms. As a result it is necessary to regulate the interchange between 
firms as Adam Smith so succinctly put it, ‘people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’150 The South African 
Competition Act includes a section regulating the conduct of firms. Chapter 2, sections 
4 and 5 of the Competition Act deal with the conduct of firms in horizontal and vertical 
relationships. 
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A ‘horizontal relationship’ refers to a relationship between competitors and a vertical 
relationship refers to a relationship between a firm and its suppliers, its customers or 
both.’151  Having a vertical or horizontal relationship between firms is not prohibited, 
however it is when these relationships lead to agreements that are restrictive in nature 
that the competition act seeks to prohibit them. Subsection 4(1)(a) of the Competition 
Act prohibits ‘agreement between’, ‘concerted practice’ or ‘decision between an 
association of firms’ that have a horizontal relationship if it has the effect of significantly 
lessening competition, unless a party to the agreement can prove that the 
‘technological’, ‘efficiency’ or other ‘pro-competitive gains’ outweighs the effect of 
significantly lessening competition.152  Subsection 4(1)(b) prohibits (a) price fixing, (b) 
dividing markets and (c) collusive tendering. However there is no defence against 
subsection 4(b) and ‘the complainant is not required to prove a negative impact on 
competition and the respondent is not entitled to invoke a pro-competitive defence.’153  
In his book, Lewis argues that though difficult to detect, cartels are also difficult for the 
accomplices to enforce and because of this, it is possible to construct a profile of a likely 
cartel. Markets with a homogenous product are more likely to collude than firms in an 
industry where there is branding and product differentiation. Lewis also states that 
economic evidence on its own is not sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel, it is still 
necessary to ‘prove a meeting of the minds’.154 
Where dumping is concerned, there is high probability that collusive action exists in the 
interactions amongst the firms. Zanardi has shown that this collusion can be both in the 
domestic market as well as in the exporting country. It is argued that one of the 
challenges of anti- dumping is that the implementation of an investigation requires 
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firms within the industry in question to come to an agreement on the impact that the 
increase in ‘dumping’ is having on their operation through the requirement that at least 
25 per cent of the domestic producers support the application.155 In effect, it encourages 
collusion between firms in the industry as firms have to come to an agreement before an 
anti-dumping investigation can be initiated. Though the threshold of an effective 25 per 
cent support might seem low, when taken from an industry with a few players for 
instance an oligopoly, then agreement between firms becomes more likely. In United 
States v International Harvester, it was noted that due to the interdependence that exists 
between the firms, firms will often act in similar fashion, however this alone is not 
indicative of collusive behaviour.156  It was also observed that ‘an agreement arises from 
the actions of and the discussions among the parties directed at arriving at an 
arrangement that will bind them either contractually or by virtue of moral suasion or 
commercial interest… Its essence is that the parties have reached some kind of 
consensus.’157 Russell Miller in the Australian Competition law and policy also stated 
that ‘evidence of the way the understanding was reached between the parties may be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence’158making it easier to prove collusion between 
firms. 
Concerted action 
Reyburn notes that, ‘it is often difficult to interpret the expressions “agreement”, 
“concerted practice” and “a decision by an association of firms”.’159 However, what is 
important to note is that the three terms all attempt to differentiate between 
independent conduct from action that is concerted or collusive in nature. Case law has 
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defined concerted practice as, ‘a form of coordination between undertakings, which, 
without having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition, practical cooperation 
between them which leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the 
normal conditions of the market.’160 Firms are not prohibited from responding to 
market conditions or from engaging with one another; however the emphasis is that 
firms have to act independently in light of the information that is available. The law 
‘strictly preclude[s] any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or 
effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential 
competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they 
themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.161  Within 
this, there are different occasions when firms can cooperate without falling foul of the 
competition authorities. These instances include when there is tacit collusion for 
example price leadership when one firm publicly announces a change in price and other 
firms follow suit. This is more likely to happen when there is a market leader and the 
firms are dealing in a homogenous product.  
Agreement 
The term ‘agreement’ contained in section 4 is defined as, ‘includes a contract, 
arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable’162 Reyburn argues 
that the way in which the term ‘agreement’ is defined in the act is very extensive 
particularly as it also includes actions that ‘cannot be defined as a “contract 
arrangement or understanding”.’163 On the basis of the decision from the Appeals Court 
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in Netstar (pty) Ltd v Competition Commission164, it can be seen that in the South 
African legislation, consensus is the basis of an agreement and this can be tacit or 
verbal. The emphasis is agreements which have the effect of limiting the ability of a firm 
to act independently due to being bound ‘either contractually or by virtue of a moral 
suasion or commercial interest’.165Due to the extensive nature of the definition, a firm 
that participates in the establishing of an agreement would be considered to be part of 
the agreement unless the firm has publicly distanced itself from the agreement. 
Ultimately, the term agreement speaks towards the raising of an expectation of action 
and this was elaborated on in the United Kingdom competition court when it was 
stated that, ‘when each of two or more parties intentionally arouses in the other an 
expectation that he will act in a certain way, it seems to me that he incurs at least a 
moral obligation to do so’166 
Association of firms 
Section 4 of the competition act also relates to decisions that are made by an ‘association 
of firms’, when the firms involved have a horizontal relationship. An association refers 
to a group of firms with similar interests and objectives. On this basis, firms come 
together to support their shared initiative, for example the South African Poultry 
Association (SAPA) whose vision is to create a ‘viable and sustainable industry’.167 To 
achieve this, ‘SAPA acts as a medium and catalyst for any matter the industry wishes to 
collectively address. It acts as the face of the industry, addressing and maintaining a 
presence in society without which opposing groups could play havoc with the 
industry's interests - without opposition.’168 It is this ability for joint action that the 
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competition act seeks to regulate. It is not only agreements that are noted as decisions 
but recommendations made by the association would also be considered as agreements 
by the association. This is further elaborated by the Tribunal which noted that the 
‘concept of a decision includes the rules of the association in question, decisions binding 
upon the members and recommendations, and in fact anything which accurately 
reflects the association’s desire to co-ordinate its members conduct in accordance with 
the statute’169. The extensive nature of this definition suggests that firms which are part 
of an association have to ensure that their objections to decisions that they do not agree 
to are noted to make sure that they do not fall foul of the law for participating in the 
association. 
3.4. Chicken Industry 
In an effort to understand the ‘status of poultry tariffs in South Africa and the possible 
impact of the proposed tariff increase for poultry imports’170, the Portfolio Committee 
on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, invited SAPA, the Competition Commission and 
the Association of Meat Importers and Exporters (AMIE) in September 2013 to make 
submissions to them. The Competition Commission produced a report analysing the 
chicken industry in the SACU region focusing on competition issues and the impact 
that the tariffs were having on competition in the sector. In the report, the Competition 
Commission noted that in 2009 they had investigated the poultry industry for possible 
competition violations of the Competition Act which included: 
 Possible market allocations – subsection 4(1)(b)(ii) 
 Exclusive supply agreements – subsection 8(d)(ii) 
 Product tying - subsection 8(d)(iii) 
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 Information exchange – section 4 (restrictive practices) 
The Competition Commission concluded that the poultry industry was ‘vertically 
integrated with high barriers to entry’171 and that anti-dumping duties were a 
competitive restraint in the industry. In their submission, they noted that the imposition 
of tariffs would have the effect of further stifling competition within the industry 
leading to higher prices for consumers.  
In defence of the industry, SAPA submitted that the poultry industry was vital to South 
Africa, providing jobs as well as supporting jobs in other vertical industries including 
agriculture. Further to this, the industry was suffering harm from ‘dumped’ imports 
which was negatively impacting the industry. In spite of all the evidence to the 
contrary, SAPA asserted that the SA poultry industry was an efficient producer of 
chicken being hampered by imports and factors beyond its control, which included 
increases in electricity prices and grain feed which are some of the primary costs for 
producing chicken. Regardless of this, the Competition Commission maintained that 
the industry was vertically integrated with high barriers to entry and that any new 
entrants would have to be integrated as well in order to succeed in the industry. In a 
comment relating to SAPA, the Competition Commission stated that, ‘often industry 
associations performed the function of the secretariat of the cartel, coordinating an anti-
competitive outcome’172, the prevalence of mergers in the industry was credited for the 
high concentration in the industry which further reduced competition. Mr 
Rumburuth173 made a comment that, ‘it was very unlikely that any firm would become 
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a competitive exporter if that firm was not subject to the discipline of competition 
locally.’174  
The discussion before the Portfolio Committee reflected the importance of coordination 
between the different agencies like the Competition Commission and ITAC. The 
possibility of industries and associations to exploit their position is reduced when 
coordination and cooperation happens amongst all the organs that are directly 
impacted by the policies to be implemented.  
3.5. Public interest  
In considering competition issues in South Africa, it is important to note the role that 
public interest plays in the competition legislation. The SA competition act of 1998 
considers the role of public interest as just as important as industry competition. This is 
written into the purpose of the act in subsection 2(b) and subsection 2(c) which states: 
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the republic in order – 
b) provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans. 175  
The lawmakers in putting together the Competition Act considered the history of South 
Africa and included policies which favoured the previously disadvantaged as defined 
by the act176. Some have questioned the necessity of the inclusion of industrial policy 
within the framework of the Competition Act, however in spite of these criticisms 
industrial policy is clearly entrenched in the Competition Act. There is an awareness of 
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the need to recognise the specific challenges facing industries as well as consumers; this 
awareness has been reflected in the decisions by the Competition Tribunal. 
This conflict between competition law and industrial policy was reflected in the 
application of anti-dumping duties to chicken imports from the United States and 
Brazil. In the application for dumping duties, SAPA indicated that the chicken industry 
contributes to job creation and that the increase in dumped imports would result in the 
loss of jobs. This was taken into consideration by the ITAC and the decision to impose 
anti-dumping duties reflected this need to protect jobs as stated in the ITAC report 
which stated that in considering the application for duties, the ITAC had ‘considered 
the levels of production, employment and investment in the domestic poultry 
industry’177. However ITAC also noted that the recommended tariff increase would 
‘place the South African poultry producers on a similar competitive footing as their 
counterparts abroad… and would not have an undue cost-raising impact on 
consumers.’178 This is aligned to the lesser duty rule contained in the anti-dumping 
regulation which some argue is an attempt at provisioning for national interest in anti-
dumping investigation. 
4. Conflict between competition and anti-dumping legislation 
Noonan notes that though ‘trade and competition policies have a common objective: 
economic efficiency… these policies have sometimes impinged on each other.’179 
Noonan further notes that there exists more ‘disharmony than harmony’ between the 
two policies. The contention is that competition law tends to be ‘more transparent, 
procedurally fairer and less discriminatory against foreign firms than trade remedy 
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laws’.180 It is this disharmony between trade and competition policy that has led to the 
continued survival of both policies in domestic jurisdictions.  
The disharmonies include the treatment and definition of key terms contained in price 
discrimination, predation and anti-dumping regulation.  These include the notion of 
injury, market power and more importantly the treatment of cost in the analysis of the 
operations of the firm in question.   
4.1. International price discrimination 
The proponents181 of anti-dumping regulation have maintained that anti-dumping 
regulation is necessary as it seeks to protect the domestic market from ‘unfair 
competition’ from foreign companies. The same price discriminating action is regulated 
under competition law with some differences which legal practitioners182 have 
indicated would make it difficult to regulate foreign price discrimination by utilising 
domestic competition law. The challenges that are cited include the requirement of 
dominance within competition law which is not required in anti-dumping legislation; 
the test for injury which is necessary for both competition law and anti-dumping 
regulation and finally the question of extraterritoriality which competition law does not 
fully address.   
Within the United States legislation, price discrimination is dealt with in subsection 13 
also known as the Robinson- Patman act183 which places the regulation of price 
discrimination within the ambit of monopoly regulation. This is consistent with 
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economic theory which requires dominance for a firm to successfully practise price 
discrimination. The requirements for dominance and significant lessening of 
competition make price discrimination conviction more stringent than the requirements 
for an anti-dumping conviction.  
4.2. International predatory pricing 
One of the challenges that economists face in accepting the validity of the price 
predation argument put forward for the support of anti-dumping remedies is the 
question of the business sense in ‘selling goods at a price below cost’ which is the 
definition used under anti-dumping regulation. The argument is that no firm will sell at 
below cost for a sustained period as they would go out of business. Therefore selling 
below cost can only be done for short periods with the intention of pricing out 
competition in order to achieve a monopoly. The action of pricing below cost is defined 
as predation and in the United States predatory pricing is treated under two different 
antitrust laws, Sherman Act together with the Robinson-Patman Act.184 It is worth 
noting that predatory pricing ‘always involves a calculated trade-off between short term 
losses and long term gains.’185 
Anti-dumping legislation considers a product as having been dumped if it is sold at a 
‘price below per unit cost of production’186, which in itself is contrary to microeconomic 
theory which teaches ‘that firms will maximise profits by selling output as long as the 
price they receive is more than the average variable cost of production. If the price is 
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less than the average variable cost of production, the firm will find it optimal to shut 
down and simply incur losses on the fixed costs.’187 
Within the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the agency 
responsible for consumer protection as well as the prevention of anti-competitive 
behaviour in the United States market. The FTC notes that the courts are largely 
sceptical of claims of predatory pricing. There is a difference between ‘predatory 
behaviour’ and ‘fierce competition’ and Taylor notes that when deciding predatory 
pricing cases, courts have difficulty in distinguishing between the two.188 It is this fine 
line that exists between predatory pricing and fierce competition that has led to a low 
success rate in predatory pricing convictions. The South African competition 
commission has succeeded in only one predation case since the inception of the new 
competition act in 1998.189 
‘the domestic difficulties in bringing successful predatory pricing actions under 
competition law are exacerbated at the international level due to cross border evidential 
difficulties...’190 which makes anti-dumping a more lucrative way of seeking relief from 
‘unfair’ competition from foreign firms. 
The foundational requirement for a predation enquiry is dominance as pricing below 
cost is considered as an abuse of dominance infringement in the South African and 
United States legislation. Therefore before a firm can be convicted of predation, it has to 
be shown that the firm in question is dominant in its relevant market. Meeting this 
requirement for dominance would make it difficult to convict international predation 
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cases as domestic firms seeking relief against predation would have to prove that the 
firm practising the predation was dominant in its home market.  
In its current form, anti-dumping does not have such requirements. All that is required 
is to show that a firm is selling at a price below its cost. Applying competition principles 
to this would mean ‘such firms could engage in dumping by international price 
discrimination or pricing below cost without fear of sanction.’191 
The requirement to show intent in predation cases also makes international predation 
an unsuitable substitute for anti-dumping regulation. This challenge is reflected in the 
limited success rate for predation cases.  
Market power 
The test for dominance is a prerequisite for price discrimination and predation in 
competition law; this is because there is recognition that only a firm with market power 
has the capacity and ability to prevent competitors from challenging its actions. 
However anti-dumping regulation does not have this requirement making it easier for 
foreign firms to be found guilty of having dumped in the domestic market. The 
Competition Act has set guidelines in the treatment of dominance. A firm with at least 
45 per cent market share in the industry in question is automatically considered to be 
dominant, whilst firms with between 35 per cent and 45 per cent can show that they are 
not dominant whilst firms with less than 35 per cent can be shown to be dominant192. 
Once dominance has been established, competition law seeks to regulate the behaviour 
of the dominant firm to ensure that the firm does not abuse its position by significantly 
lessening competition through anti-competitive behaviour.193  
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Economists recognise that price discrimination is a necessary part of business 
operations, and the requirement of dominance ensures that regulation is not utilised to 
stifle competition within the industry but rather to promote it. Within the United States 
competition law, the way the law has been interpreted by the courts makes it evident 
that the existence of a monopoly is not illegal but instead the attempt to maintain the 
monopoly position by using unfair business practices.194  
However, in the regulation of dumping, a firm does not have to be dominant in its 
respective market to be convicted of dumping. This means that a firm requesting for 
anti-dumping duties only has to show that the foreign firm is selling goods at a price 
below the price which it is selling the same or like product in its respective domestic 
market (normal value).  
This disparity between the application of competition law and anti-dumping legislation, 
once again shows a marked favour for companies who lay their petitions on the basis of 
‘unfair’ competition utilising the anti-dumping instrument rather than competition law. 
This is because anti-dumping regulation does not require the firm to be dominant 
whereas competition law requires dominance to be proven first.  
Injury to the firm versus injury to the industry 
The concept of material injury is central to anti-dumping investigations. An anti-
dumping duty can only be implemented if an industry can show that they have 
suffered material injury as a direct result of dumping by a foreign firm or industry.195 
Similar language appears in competition law, with a key difference that competition 
law seeks to protect the competitive process which enhances consumer welfare, rather 
than individual firms or industries. This is captured in the statement that competition 
                                                     
 
194 Single firm conduct available from https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct accessed on 17 July 2015 
195 Agreement on the implementation of article VI of GATT 1994 section 3 
   58 
 
 
law is meant to ‘protect competition, not competitors’196 and yet as the tribunal has also 
noted that, ‘no competitors, no competition’.197 Therefore an opportunity arises to find a 
mid-point between the implementation of dumping legislation and the practise of 
competition law. 
In a statement to the ad hoc sub – committee on anti-trust and anti-dumping, it was 
noted that ‘section 2(a) (of the Robinson Patman Act) 198 must be read in conformity with 
the public policy of preserving competition, but it is not concerned with mere shifts of 
business between competitors. It is concerned with substantial impairment of the vigor 
or health of the contest for business, regardless of which competitor wins or loses’.199 
The same sentiment appears in South African competition legislation where the 
emphasis and the tone of the legislation clearly indicate that the role of competition law 
is to protection the competitive process rather than competitors.200 To achieve this, 
competition law requires the test of ‘significant lessening of competition’ to show that 
competition is being impeded (section 9(1) of the competition act of 1998) whereas anti-
dumping legislation is less restrictive. 
Where significant lessening of competition in competition law requires that the 
competition be shown to be materially affected, the requirement for support from at 
least 25 per cent of the domestic production volume reflects the deference to the firm 
rather than a regard for the industry.  This once again displays the preference to protect 
the competitors rather than the competitive processes which is ingrained in the anti-
dumping regulation. The competitor in anti-dumping regulation can take the form of an 
industry that is seeking protection.  
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It is this possibility to gain protection for an industry that opens up the system to the 
possibility of collusion through rent seeking activities utilising the anti-dumping 
regulation. 
Average Variable Cost versus Normal value 
Predation and anti-dumping are shaped on the basis that an industry or competitor is 
suffering harm because another firm is selling products at a lower price than what is 
expected under the market conditions. The form that this selling price takes differs 
depending on which legislation one defers to. Within the anti-dumping legislation, the 
selling price considered is the normal value which is defined as selling price in the 
domestic market. This is in contrast to the definition in predation which considers the 
marginal or variable cost of the firm selling the products. 
Anti-dumping regulation therefore fails to take into account circumstances that might 
be pertinent to the price setting mechanism utilised by the importing firm. This was 
illustrated in the case of the chicken imports from the United States where the chicken 
producers in the United States highlighted that their pricing strategy was a reflection of 
the ability to segment the market because they understood the difference in preferences 
firstly within the United States meat market and secondly between the United States 
chicken market and the South African chicken market. This ability to segment the 
market allowed them to charge different prices for the different parts of the chicken 
within the United States, relying on the consumer’s willingness to pay more for their 
preferred cuts of meat. This meant that they were able to recoup the maximum value 
out of the chicken and could therefore utilise the net realisable value as a cost base. 
They were then able to sell dark meat in the South African market at a price that could 
be construed as lower than their cost base in the United States market as they were 
already recouping most of their cost in the United States market. In effect this form of 
aggressive competition was then deemed to be dumping leading to the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties which in effect protected the market. 
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In the analysis of predation however, the concept of cost is dealt with in a more detailed 
format. The requirement to consider average or marginal cost means the regulation 
does not leave room for misrepresentation of costs. However this does not make the 
cost analysis any easier to apply as noted in Competition Commission v Media 24 
where it was observed that ‘practical experience with cost based rules is that they are 
often complex to apply in practice’.201 This challenge in applying cost based analysis 
stems from the need to obtain information from the firm being challenged which might 
not be easily accessible. This difficulty means the direct application of cost based 
analysis in anti-dumping investigation would make seeking redress under anti-
dumping regulation even more of a challenge.  
4.3. Possibility of ‘rent seeking’  
 Rent seeking is defined as a firm’s attempt to find economic advantage from others 
without giving anything back which can be achieved by lobbying governments for 
preferential trade policies. David Lewis in his presentation on competition and 
corruption at the OECD202 said ‘rent seeking’ can be good and it can be bad, and it is for 
competition law to regularly assess the industries and utilise the resources available to 
them including market enquiries to prevent the increase of ‘bad rents’.  
Anti-dumping legislation seems to encourage bad rents as reflected in the chicken case 
as discussed in previous sections. Another notable example is the anti-dumping duties 
that were levied on Bridon International UK (Bridon), after SCAW South Africa 
(SCAW) levied charges of dumping against ‘stranded wire, rope and cables of iron steel 
originating in or imported from various countries including the UK’203. According to 
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Hauer, even though the investigations by the Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT)204 found 
dumping to exist in only one product (fishing rope), the recommendation was to 
impose duties on a number of products which included cables. At an interim review in 
2006, ITAC found that the dumping on fishing ropes had stopped, however the 
dumping duty of 42 per cent was not removed which opened up the possibility of 
SCAW requesting a sunset review when the five year dumping period was coming to 
an end. After the investigation, ITAC recommended that the dumping duties be 
removed as ‘steel fishing ropes produced by Bridon UK were stored in South Africa, 
they were kept in bonded warehouses and sold to foreign vessels.  They did not enter 
the SACU or South Africa for “home consumption”.’205 Consequently no Value Added 
Tax (VAT) or customs duties were payable on them. In response to this, SCAW went on 
to take the ITAC to the High Court to prevent them from putting the recommendation 
through to the minister206 which would mean having the anti-dumping duty 
withdrawn. The high court granted the appeal to SCAW on the ‘possibility (that) re-
introducing dumped fishing rope in the market contained a significant risk of damage 
for the local industry’.207 ITAC appealed this decision at the constitutional court where 
the decision by the High Court was set aside as the judge reasoned that: 
 ‘If ITAC has botched its investigative processes the High Court is entitled to 
extend the legislatively fixed lifespan of the anti-dumping duty. 
 The fact that the recommendation is a “jurisdictional fact” does not entitle an 
aggrieved party to an interdict that gives new life to an anti-dumping duty 
whose duration would otherwise end. 
                                                     
 
204 Board on Tariffs and Trade is the predecessor to the International Trade and Administration 
Committee (ITAC) 
205 SCAW South Africa v International Trade and Administration Commission 2010 CCT 59/09; [2010] 
ZACC 6 
206 ITAC makes recommendations to the minister who has the final say. 
207 LH Hanauer Anti-dumping: From trade remedy to regulatory protectionism in the Voices of Africa 
2012 p21 
   62 
 
 
 It was inappropriate for the High Court to grant an interim order which invaded 
the terrain of the national executive function without appropriate justification.’208 
 The decision by the constitutional court was important in that it reinforced that ‘the 
principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises the functional 
independence of branches of government’209, whilst noting ‘no constitutional scheme 
can reflect a complete separation of powers: the scheme is always one of partial 
separation’. This ensures that ITAC can properly do its work without fear of 
interference from other government departments. It also re-enforced the authority and 
independence of ITAC from firms seeking to get a favourable response for applications 
made. 
The SCAW case reflects the challenges of the application of anti-dumping duties in 
concentrated markets. In the first application by SCAW for anti-dumping duties on 
Bridon, it is instrumental to note that the only company mentioned in the application is 
SCAW, suggesting that they might have been the only firm in that specific industry, 
therefore in a position where they could seek protection by means of the anti-dumping 
regulation. Hauner notes that at the time of the application for anti-dumping duties, the 
operations were housed in SCAW international and SCAW South Africa, with SCAW 
South Africa having Anglo America as the majority Shareholder. This further suggests 
that at the time of application, SCAW could have been a monopoly in the specific 
market that it was seeking protection for from a similarly dominant international 
competitor (Bridon) and using the regulation as a way of rent seeking. 
In the end, the SCAW case reflects how anti-dumping regulation can be abused by 
market participants and why it is essential to have competition law principles 
embedded in the anti-dumping regulation for a holistic application of the law.  
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4.4. Case study:  Matsushita v.  Zenith  
The ever present conflict between competition law and anti-dumping remedies was 
brought into sharp relief in two cases one which involved the Japanese trade in 
semiconductors which was brought before the WTO panel in 1988,210 and the other, 
Matsushita v. Zenith211 which played out in the United States legal system.  In both 
cases the question arose on which law would prevail between anti-dumping and 
competition law. 
 In 1974 Zenith filed a charge against Japanese Television importers into the United 
States of America. Zenith alleged ‘violations of section 1 and 2 of the Sherman act, along 
with claims under the Wilson Tariff Act and the anti-dumping Act of 1916’212. The 
question before the courts was whether the law had been violated in the Japanese 
manufacturers importing at low prices into the United States and whether intent of 
injuring the United States market could be shown to have existed in the actions of the 
Japanese importers. As with most cases of predation and price discrimination, the 
challenge to prove intent as well as injury could not be met. However, on the basis of 
the same information supplied to the competition authorities, Zenith was able to get 
anti-dumping duties imposed against the Japanese importers. This once again 
confirming the ease with which companies are able to seek relief by applying for anti-
dumping duties compared to competition law. 
The history of the Japanese television story started centuries before the Zenith case 
came to trial. The Japanese story started with the development of the television 
industry, as the industry developed, the Japanese market was divided between the 
domestic and the international market. The argument was that the Japanese market was 
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producing more televisions that the domestic market could sustain. As a result there 
was a meticulous effort in developing an international market for the ‘excess’ 
televisions. However to ensure that the domestic prices did not fall below a certain 
level, ‘the Japanese television manufacturers cartel’213 was developed.  
The Japanese Television cartel 
The television cartel was part of a bigger scheme of price fixing which included other 
major household appliance manufacturers the purpose of which was ‘to control 
wholesale and retail prices of home electric appliances and to prevent shipment of 
products to discounters’.214 Beyond fixing the price, the cartel also attempted to restrict 
output in order to maintain the price levels. As television production continued to grow 
in Japan, there was a gradual shift towards the export market and the United States was 
one of the locations that the Japanese started to export televisions.  In 1963, the Japanese 
television manufacturers entered into an “export cartel agreement”. Part of the 
agreement involved setting up a minimum export price in the United States, it is 
important to note that this action was supported by the Japanese government through 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
According to First, the Japanese manufacturers set up an elaborate system of the cartel 
which included different meetings according to the rank of the representatives that 
would meet at the regular intervals; a group for middle managers (the tenth day 
group), senior managers group (the palace group) and the presidents of the companies 
(the okura group), and the cartel ‘discussions included minimum prices, margins for 
wholesalers and retailers, and the level of rebates.’215 Nine years after the first 
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investigation, Japan’s Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) began a new216 investigation into 
the industry which led to a charge on six of the major television manufacturers with a 
violation of section 3 of the anti-monopoly law (a horizontal restraint of trade) arising 
out of their activities in the domestic market.217  
The television market continued to grow in Japan with increased developments in the 
technology utilised in the manufacturing of televisions, a process which was further 
assisted by the MITI through the provision of financial assistance. In order to facilitate 
the cartel behaviour in the United States of America, a ‘five company rule’ was adopted 
by the Japanese manufacturing firms. The ‘five company’ limited the firms that the 
Japanese firms could have export arrangements with in the United States for export 
purposes, with each Japanese firm being limited to five firms. This arrangement was 
adopted as part of the rules of the Japan Machinery Exporters Association (JMEA), and 
the arrangement was filed with MITI.  
In 1968, the U.S. electronic industries association filed a complaint against the Japanese 
manufacturers alleging that the Japanese manufacturers were selling televisions in the 
United States for “less than fair value” and therefore violating the antidumping Act of 
1921. In 1970 the National Union Electric Company (NUE) ‘filed suit seeking damages 
under the antitrust laws and the antidumping Act of 1916’,218 and in 1971 the Tariff 
Commission ‘decided that the U.S. industry was being injured as a result of television 
imports from Japan being sold at less than fair value’219leading to the imposition of 
dumping duties on imports of televisions from Japan. 
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 Three months after Matsushita acquired Motorola’s Quasar television division, ‘Zenith 
filed a private antitrust suit against the major Japanese television producers. In the suit, 
Zenith alleged violations of section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, along with claims under 
the Wilson Tariff Act and the Antidumping Act of 1916,’220 Zenith’s suit was 
consolidated with NUE’s. Though the other firms did not join Zenith’s suit, they went 
on to file complaints with the ‘International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging unfair 
methods of competition by Japanese television manufacturers in violation of section 
337(b) of the tariff Act of 1930.’221 One more suit was laid against the Japanese 
manufacturers, this time by the committee to preserve American Color Television 
(COMPACT), which alleged that the Japanese were importing televisions in to the U.S. 
in such increased quantities to ‘be a substantial cause of injury to the domestic 
industry’222 and this was filed under section 201 of the trade reform act of 1974.  
At this point, there were six suits against the Japanese manufacturers, with two being 
laid under competition regulation and four under different trade regulations which 
include anti-dumping. Though the suits were laid in different platforms, they all 
alleged the same prohibition; selling below cost by a competitor with the result of 
obstructing the market. However the requirements to be met for a satisfactory charge 
were different leading to some of the charges failing to succeed.  
The competition law charge under the Sherman act proved to be the most stringent in 
requirements. Zenith as the complainant had to prove that the Japanese firms’ price 
action was predatory in nature and also that there was a cartel in operation. As a result 
they had to meet the test of predation which is pricing below cost and also show the 
intent of the Japanese firms. Zenith also had to show the existence of a cartel to support 
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the predation charge. In their decision, the supreme court of appeal reasoned that 
predation could not exist as,  
‘Predatory pricing conspiracies are, by nature, speculative. They require the 
conspirators to sustain substantial losses in order to recover uncertain gains. The 
alleged conspiracy is therefore implausible. Moreover, the record discloses that the 
alleged conspiracy has not succeeded in over two decades of operation. This is strong 
evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist. The possibility that petitioners have 
obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market does not alter this 
assessment.’223 
The possibility of ‘chill(ing) the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect’224 motivated the court in ruling that there was every possibility that the 
complainants were doing so out of distress from aggressive competition rather than 
anti-competitive behavior by the Japanese firms. The trade division however took a 
different view. First notes that the United States industry had greater success under 
trade law and they were able to get anti-dumping penalties imposed on electrical 
products from Japan, including semi-conductors.  
The Japanese and United States electrical manufacturers’ case illustrated the divergent 
views that exist between competition law and trade law. What is evident is that 
competition law offers greater certainty in terms of the application of the law which 
does not exist in the application of anti-dumping law. This encourages firms to utilise 
the anti-dumping instrument as a way of containing international competition. 
However it is also evident that competition law is not entirely capable of dealing with 
matters of international anti-competitive behaviour. The Japanese electrical 
manufacturers clearly functioned as a domestic cartel which was not only documented 
                                                     
 
223 Matsushita v. Zenith Ratio Corp. op cit (n212) 
224 Harry op cit (n213) 223 
   68 
 
 
but supported by the government through the MITI. 225 The Japanese industry was 
protected by the government and encouraged to export to external markets. The 
existence of the domestic cartel and the closed market ensured that the Japanese 
manufacturers were able to enjoy high prices in the domestic market. Through the 
international cartel arrangement characterised by ‘price checks’ and market segregation 
through the application of the ‘five company rule’ the Japanese manufactures were then 
able to charge lower prices in the United States market which is anti-competitive. Yet 
competition regulation was not sufficient to stop this anti-competitive behaviour which 
the trade regulators were then able to deal with. 
5. Recommendations 
There have been many recommendations on how anti-dumping regulation can be 
modified but others have been more radical calling for the removal of anti-dumping 
legislation226. However, critics have had to acknowledge that the removal of the anti-
dumping regulation is not feasible as there are political ramifications to this and also 
they acknowledge that at the moment there is no credible alternative to the problem of 
cross boarder price discrimination and predation. Alternatives have been suggested 
with most of them centering around competition law disciplines, but even that does not 
offer a full solution but rather reduces the conflict that exists between anti-dumping and 
competition law.  
5.1. International competition law 
The most radical of the recommendations has been the proposition to remove anti-
dumping legislation and replace it with an international competition framework. This 
call has been a response to the uncertainty embedded in anti-dumping investigations. 
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Note cited in a report by Victor, comments that anti-dumping in contrast to competition 
law, ‘ although enacted to restrain unfair competitive influences, proceedings under the 
anti-dumping laws often produce effects which unduly restrict another source of 
competition – foreign competition – whether or not it is unfair’ 227, Note continues and 
asserts that the reason for this restrictive impact on foreign competition could be that 
anti-dumping regulation is a ‘curious hybrid of traditional tariff ideas and price 
discrimination theories of anti-trust’228. It is this link between anti-dumping and price 
discrimination which has led to increasing calls for an international competition 
framework.  
An international competition framework would however require consensus and this 
has delayed the implementation of such a network. Some WTO members have 
attempted to bring competition under the jurisdiction of the WTO; however this has 
come under severe criticism from member countries like the United States of America 
who have continued to resist what they see as a potential threat to their sovereignty. In 
a compromise, the WTO set up a working group to investigate the possibility of 
including competition issues in the WTO agreement. The divergent views of the 
member countries have however meant that no consensus can be reached. A significant 
development from the working group however was the recognition of ‘the contribution 
of competition policy to achieving the objectives of the WTO, including the promotion 
of international trade.’229 Fox contends that the issue of anti-dumping is about market 
access, and international competition would ensure that unfair competition would be 
legislated without impinging on the market access of foreign firms. This would enhance 
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the work of the WTO which seeks to promote free trade and as an aftermath free 
competition as the two regulations, ‘trade and competition are two sides of one coin.’230 
International competition law would therefore provide the transparency and due 
process necessary for firms to have confidence that they would be treated fairly in 
dumping investigations. However the challenge of getting consensus from countries 
necessitates the provision of an alternative as practitioners attempt to get consensus. 
5.2. Coordination and Co-operation between agencies 
As a form of compromise to international competition law, coordination and 
cooperation has also been proposed.231 Recognising the challenge of obtaining 
consensus in amending anti-dumping laws, opponents have suggested increased 
cooperation between member states. This move is seen as a more viable way of 
encouraging trade and at the same time ensuring that firms doing business across 
boarders observe the competition laws of the importing country. The United States of 
America has been at the forefront of this and has sought to have cooperation 
agreements with other countries to assist in investigating competition charges laid 
against foreign competitors. ‘In April 1999 the United states and Australia signed the 
first bilateral agreement specifically designed to facilitate the exchange of evidence in 
antitrust investigations (subject to Australian Parliament)’232.  
The European Union (EU) exemplifies what the advocates for cooperation would seek 
to have with regards to investigations relating to unfair competition from foreign firms. 
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Within the EU, the European Commission (Commission) functions as the executive 
body responsible for setting legislation and representing the interests of the EU to the 
rest of the world. However, each country within the EU has its own established 
competition authority which has the jurisdiction to investigate and make decisions on 
competition related issues. The Commission then established the European 
Competition Network (ECN); the network is responsible for facilitating ‘discussion and 
cooperation of European competition authorities in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union are applied.’233 The Commission 
emphasise that the ECN does not create a legally enforceable requirement but allows for the 
sharing of information and states that ‘all competition authorities within the Network 
are independent from one another. [And] Cooperation between NCAs and with the 
Commission takes place on the basis of equality, respect and solidarity.’234 The member 
countries also recognise that their standards might be different but work on a system of 
mutual respect and where a case concerns more than one country, the countries seek to 
agree on the best positioned member to investigate the matter.  This structure of  the  
EU competition law ensures that ‘an entity which has suffered injury due to a violation 
of the EC Competition Law is able to bring its case to the relevant member country’s 
court and recover actual damages according to the member country’s national remedies 
for antitrust violations.’235 This means that within the EU community, anti-dumping 
does not apply but rather competition law is applied in instances where there are cross 
boarder competition issues amongst member countries. The supporters of an 
international competition network in essence recommend a system that is similar to the 
ECN, which would facilitate information sharing, discussion and cooperation. 
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An alternative to the EU form of cooperation is the use of plurilateral236 agreements. 
Advocates for free trade have long argued that the growth of free trade areas reduces 
the need for anti-dumping and other trade related regulations. This development can be 
seen in the proliferation of free trade agreements which incorporate customs as well as 
competition bodies to regulate competition within the free trade arrangement. Though 
this arrangement offers better prospects, it is still not one that the supporters of the 
WTO would want as it encourages agreements outside the WTO hence diminishing the 
significance of the WTO’s unilateral agreement.237  
5.3. Adding competition principles to anti-dumping agreements 
Competition principles are integral to anti-dumping agreements. Supporters of anti-
dumping as an instrument have long argued that anti-dumping is essential to protect 
domestic industries from unfair competition from foreign firms. Therefore it seems in 
order that anti-dumping agreements encompass more competition principles. This can 
be achieved by tightening the requirements for anti-dumping investigations as well as 
cooperation between the trade and competition authorities. ‘The enforcement of 
competition law in trade cases is “of particular importance since it limits the risk that 
domestic producers may use the threat of initiating action under domestic trade law or 
otherwise lobbying protection in order to induce foreign exporters to enter into 
unlawful restrictive agreements.’’238 Changes that would enhance the competitive 
aspects of anti-dumping investigations include the addition of a market test. 
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Dominance 
Dominance is fundamental in the regulation of price discrimination and predation in 
competition law. Importance is placed in proving that the firm that is practicing the 
price discrimination has sufficient market power to materially injure the industry in 
question. Within South African competition law this is done by looking at the market 
share of the firm accused of abusing its dominant position.  
Victor239 recommends that the same requirement should be included in anti-dumping 
regulation. Anti-dumping has been used as a way to protect competitors especially in 
concentrated markets. This has the effect of encouraging collusion amongst the industry 
participants to force the foreign importers to either withdraw or increase their prices. 
Imposing a test of dominance would ensure that the anti-dumping investigation would 
only proceed when it is against a firm that is at least dominant in its home market and is 
of a size to hamper the domestic industry. 
In order to achieve this, the trade bodies would need to work closely with the 
competition authorities to investigate the complaining industry as well as to coordinate 
with the foreign competition body to ensure that the firm in question is neither 
dominant nor part of a cartel. Victor et al recommend that in conjunction with 
‘advocating an antitrust analysis in anti-dumping cases, the antitrust division has 
suggested that a higher level of market penetration (should) be required in cases 
involving concentrated domestic industries’.240 This idea is shared by others including 
Zanardi who see the lack of market threshold as a hindrance and argue that ‘the costs of 
coordination are clearly related to the number of producers in the market’.241In essence 
the fewer the number of firms in the industry the lower the costs of coordination 
become, making it easier and more profitable for collusion to happen.  
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The inclusion of the market concentration test would therefore prevent firms in a 
concentrated home industry from abusing their position by instigating anti-dumping 
investigations when the problem lies in an inefficient domestic industry. 
Product scope 
According to the anti-dumping agreement, ‘the term “like product” is a product that is 
identical (… alike in all respects to the product under consideration).’242 This is deemed 
to be imprecise and open for misinterpretation by trade law practitioners.  The conflict 
between the chicken importers from the United States and the South African poultry 
industry reflects how an imprecise classification of products as ‘like’ can lead to an 
‘unfair’ treatment of a foreign firm243.  In contrast in the predation case between Zenith 
and the Japanese television exporters, the court decided that due to the differences in 
technical requirements for televisions sold in Japan and televisions sold in the United 
States the two products could not be treated as ‘like’ products or directly competitive 
products.244 This challenge removes the assurance that business requires to effectively 
operate. The concept of ‘likeness’ therefore becomes a reflection of the regulators views 
on the necessity of protecting the domestic industries. 
WTO case law has established an assessment for ‘likeness’ to ensure uniformity in the 
application of the law. The assessment:  
‘comprise four categories of ‘characteristics’ that the products involved might share: (i) the 
physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the 
same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as 
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alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or 
demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes.’245 
Adamantopoulos adds that the assessment utilised for the ‘likeness’ test ‘should be 
precise enough not to leave wide margins of discretion to the administering 
authorities’.246  
Material Injury 
‘The anti-dumping law injury requirement embodies a relatively low threshold’247 and 
in order to add credibility to anti-dumping regulation it is essential to reconsider the 
way the notion of ‘injury’ is treated in anti-dumping investigations. The 
recommendations to give greater consideration to the injury test include allowing 
greater participation by interest groups to allow for a more inclusive analysis of the 
impact of the ‘dumping’ action.  However this in itself does not resolve the conflict in 
the lenient manner that injury is addressed in dumping investigations. The ad hoc 
subcommittee makes a recommendation that ‘it would be sound policy to apply the 
effect – on- competition approach of the antitrust laws before finding an “injury” in a 
dumping case’.248This would strengthen the competitive approach in the anti-dumping 
investigation through the increased emphasis on the effect on competition. This would 
also prevent industries that are inherently inefficient from seeking protection using the 
anti-dumping instrument. An industry would have to demonstrate that the pricing 
action of the foreign firm is having the effect of hampering competition due to the 
pricing being ‘unfair’ (that is pricing below average cost) rather than aggressive 
competition from a foreign firm. 
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6. Conclusion 
The need to protect domestic markets led to the creation of the anti-dumping remedies 
within the WTO. With increased market openness through the reduction of tariffs as 
well as the removal of non–tariff barriers, domestic markets faced increased foreign 
competition. Left with little in the way of protection against possible ‘unfair’ 
competition, countries like the United States argued for anti-dumping legislation. They 
argued that in order to protect their markets against ‘unfair’ competition from foreign 
firms, it was necessary to have anti-dumping remedies as a stop gap measure. Anti-
dumping was therefore initiated fundamentally as a form of domestic protection 
against foreign competition. However, as a negotiated remedy, the language used in 
anti-dumping regulation does little to address the issue that it was meant to protect as it 
was necessary to have consensus amongst all the member countries before it could be 
ratified.  
‘[W]ith the ingrained international recognition of dumping as an ‘unfair’ trade practice 
in the WTO, the political will to eliminate the remedy does not exist among major 
antidumping law users, such as the United States and European Union.’249 This lack of 
political will indicate that anti-dumping regardless of its flaws is going to continue to 
exist as a WTO remedy to ‘unfair’ competition from foreign firms. However nations do 
have the opportunity of amending their country anti-dumping laws to enhance their 
competitiveness.   
The question of whether anti-dumping regulation succeeds in preventing ‘unfair’ 
competition is central to the discussion on the value and necessity of anti-dumping 
regulation. The economic fundamentals around anti-dumping are doubtful as it is 
difficult to see how a foreign competitor would be able to ‘materially injure’ domestic 
competition utilising price discrimination or predation. In most legislations including 
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South Africa, price discrimination and predation are considered as abuse of dominance 
infringements. This stems from an understanding that only a firm of a particular size 
would be able to adversely impede competition through price discrimination and 
similar activities. The competition act therefore prohibits dominant firms from ‘selling 
goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost’, however there is an 
understanding that not all selling below costs is detrimental to the industry or is 
intended to harm competitors. It is with this in mind that the competition Act makes 
provision for a defence of reason against a price discrimination and predation charge. 
It is also recognised that ‘a monopoly is a canker that eats into a free enterprise 
economy … legislature showed (s) an awareness that power may be abused.’ 250 As a 
result, another key aspect to the protection of competition is the prevention of 
concentrated industries such as oligopolies from coming together in a way that hampers 
competition. The regulation of the cooperation and coordination amongst firms is 
defined in cartel regulation. There is an understanding that when firms come together, 
it can have the effect of obstructing competition which has the effect of reducing 
consumer welfare. A high priority for the European Commission is fighting cartels, ‘this 
is because of the serious harm cartels cause to consumers and businesses. And the huge 
damage cartels inflict on the economy as a whole in terms of removing incentives to 
compete on prices or to innovate.’251 Due to the threat to competition that cartels pose, 
the South African competition law considers this type of behaviour as per se illegal.  
The question of jurisdiction is central to the legislation of export cartels, and the South 
African legislation showed an ability to deal with this type of cartel in American 
Natural Soda Ash Corp v Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd252. The legislators reiterated that the 
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Competition Act ‘applies to all economic activity within or having an effect within, the 
Republic,’253 which infers that the Competition Act is equipped to deal with any anti-
competitive act that has an effect on the South African market. South Africa is not the 
only country that has found it necessary to include similar provision in its legislation. 
The United States enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTIA),254 which gives the United States jurisdiction to hear cases where a foreign act 
has an impact on the United States. In Minn-Chem, Inc. v Agrium Inc.255, the court of 
appeals noted that ‘[f]oreigners who want to earn money from the sale of goods and 
services in American markets should expect to have to comply with U.S law.’256 The 
ability to adjudicate on cases where foreign firms are involved means that countries 
have the ability to safeguard domestic industries without resorting to anti-dumping 
regulation. However where firms do not have local representation, imposing penalties 
offers limited relief to the injured firms. 
The requirements to initiate a dumping investigation are undemanding on the local 
industry, requiring that an application ‘be made by or on behalf of the domestic 
industry’. 257 The low threshold of 25 per cent support from the total domestic 
production of the like product makes the legislation vulnerable to abuse particularly 
from concentrated industries where a few firms can make up more than 50 per cent of 
the total output. This has been recognised as fostering collusion in the domestic market 
as well as being used as a negotiating tactic by domestic firms to force foreign firms to 
work with them. This analysis has been researched on extensively by Zanardi as 
reflected in his article on ‘Antidumping law as a collusive device’;258 who argues that 
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the collusive elements in anti-dumping law are more pronounced when the industry in 
focus is a concentrated industry with a few firms with market power. The possibility of 
collusion in anti-dumping law emphasises the need for greater regulation in the 
implementation of anti-dumping law.  
The concept of ‘material injury’ is central to anti-dumping investigation, with an 
emphasis on ensuring that only instances where the injury is of a material nature will 
attract dumping margins. The anti-dumping act defines a margin of de minimis 
(negligible) as one where the margin of dumping is ‘less than 2 per cent, expressed as a 
percentage of the export price’259, however this safeguard would only assist in 
strengthening the investigations if the anti-dumping law defined more firmly terms 
including ‘normal value’. In the absence of this safety measure, the anti-dumping 
investigation would hardly find that the margin of dumping was negligible, at the same 
time, the ‘chilling effect’ of anti-dumping occurs from the moment of a dumping 
investigation notification. 
The limitations in the anti-dumping law have led to various recommendations on how 
to strengthen the trade remedy, with the most drastic recommendation being to remove 
it. However the political nature of anti-dumping has meant that the removal of anti-
dumping legislation is not going to be on the agenda any time soon. This opens up the 
debate to other alternatives and the most acceptable by the WTO members is an 
amendment to the current anti-dumping legislation by including competition principles 
into the legislation.  
Firstly with recognition of the interface between price discrimination and anti- 
dumping, through the inclusion of price discrimination principles into anti-dumping 
regulation which would strengthen the regulation by ensuring that there is less room to 
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manipulate the system. The competition principles that can be incorporated include a 
market size test of the domestic industries before an investigation can be initiated; 
redefining the term ‘normal value’ to ensure that only instances of pricing below 
average marginal cost are regulated; and ensuring that the term ‘like product’ is 
redefined narrowly to ensure that the product scope in investigations is restricted to 
products that are being dumped. 
The necessity of including these changes is reflected in the request for consultations 
with South Africa by Brazil260 over the imposition of anti-dumping duties. In the 
request, Brazil noted that South Africa ‘incorrectly considered, inter alia: (i) the volume 
and price of products outside the scope of the product under investigation; (ii) import 
data provided by petitioner, which grossly overstated official import statistics for the 
products; (iii) the existence of a negative effect of dumped imports on domestic prices, 
when the data indicated otherwise;…’261 which is in contravention to subsection 3(1) 
and 3(2) of the anti-dumping agreement.  Brazil also indicated that in the injury 
determination, South Africa failed to ‘consider other known factors causing injury to 
the domestic industry...’262 in contravention of subsection 3(5) of the anti-dumping 
agreement. This challenge from Brazil demonstrates the necessity of correctly applying 
the technical aspects of anti-dumping investigations but also the ease with which the 
anti-dumping instrument can be manipulated to satisfy interest groups.  
Competition principles would address the challenges found in the application of anti-
dumping regulation however this can only be achieved with increased coordination 
and cooperation between the trade and competition authorities.  This will ensure that 
competition is protected and consumer welfare is enhanced through freer trade.  
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7. Glossary of terms 
AAC Average Avoidable Cost 
ADA Anti-dumping Agreement (WTO) 
AMIE Association of Meat Importers and Exporters (SA) 
AP Appellate Body (WTO) 
ATC Average Total Cost 
AVC Average Variable Cost  
BTT Board on Tariffs and Trade (SA) 
COMPACT committee to preserve American Color Television 
DAFF Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (SA) 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body (WTO) 
DTI The Department of Trade and Industry (SA) 
ECN European Competition Network 
EU European Union 
FTC Federal Trade Commission (USA) 
FTIA Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (USA) 
GATT 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (WTO) 
GOES 2013 Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel  
ICN International Competition Network 
IQF Individually Quick Frozen 
ITAA  International Trade and Administration Act of 2002 (SA) 
ITAC 
International Trade Administration Commission of 
South Africa 
ITC International Trade Commission (USA) 
JFTC Japan Fair Trade Commission 
JMEA Japan Machinery Exporters Association 
MFN Most Favoured Nation (WTO) 
MITI Ministry of International trade and Industry (Japan) 
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MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China  
NCA National Competition Authority (EU) 
NUE National Union Electric Company  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development 
SA South Africa 
SACU Southern African Customs Union  
SAPA South African Poultry Association  
SCAW SCAW South Africa  
SLN substantially lessening competition  
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
UNCTAD United Nations Centre for Trade and Development  
VAT Value Added Tax  
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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